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THE RELEVANCE OF TORT LAW DOCTRINES
TO RULE 10b-5:
SHOULD CARELESS PLAINTIFFS BE
DENIED RECOVERY?
Margaret V. Sachs*
INTRODUCTION

Private litigation under section 10(b) l of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 and rule lOb-5 3 is at present riddled with tort
law doctrines. 4 Familiar tort concepts such as aiding and abet*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Bridgeport School of Law. A.B. 1973,

J.D. 1977, Harvard University.
Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange-

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) [hereinafter cited as section 10(b)].
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)-(kk) (1982) [hereinafter cited
as 1934 Act].
3 Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
1942, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use

of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985) [hereinafter cited as rule lOb-5].
Neither rule lOb-5 nor § 10(b) expressly provides for a private action. See supra
notes 1, 3. Beginning with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa.
1946), however, lower federal courts implied a private action for violations of the rule.
By 1969 a private action under rule 1Ob-5 had been upheld by 10 of the 11 United States
courts of appeals. See 6 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 3871-73 (2d ed. Supp. 1969)
(collecting cases). The Supreme Court first recognized the private action in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
4 Tort principles underlay judicial implication of a private action under rule lOb-5.
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ting,5 respondeat superior, 6 plaintiff's duty of care, 7 in pani delicto,8
and contribution 9 have been imported into the rule lob-5 private
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), the first case to imply
a private action under rule lOb-5, was premised on the theory that "[t]he disregard of
the command of a statute is . . . a tort." Id. at 513. The Supreme Court's subsequent
acknowledgements of the private action have failed to address its putative basis in tort
law. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380-81 & n.10 (1983); Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life
& Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). The Court's rejection of the tort law basis
does seem to follow, however, from its recent rulings that implied actions are appropriate only where intended by Congress. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-24 (1979) (no implied private action under § 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1982)); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560, 574-79 (no implied action for damages under § 17(a) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1982)).
5 E.g., Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983); IIT v.
Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 943-44
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 89 (1983); Walck v. American Stock Exch., Inc.,
687 F.2d 778, 790-91 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 942 (1983); Stokes v. Lokken,
644 F.2d 779, 782-83 (8th Cir. 1981); Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84,
94-97 (5th Cir. 1975).
6 E.g., Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th
Cir. 1980); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 712-16 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 694 (6th Cir. 1976).
But see Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884-86 (3d Cir. 1975) (liability of
employer not based on respondeat superior doctrine; basis for liability was "controlling
person" provision of Exchange Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982)); Zweig v'. Hearst
Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
7 E.g., Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1515-19 (10th Cir. 1983); White v.
Sanders, 689 F.2d 1366, 1369 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co.,
615 F.2d 68, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981); Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1196-97 (8th Cir. 1978); Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d
542, 559 & n.21 (1st Cir. 1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033,
1048 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 596-98
(3d Cir. 1976). See also National Bank v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 528 F. Supp. 940, 949
(E.D. Mich. 1981) (action could not be maintained where plaintiffs failed to exercise
minimal degree of care and due diligence required by 1934 Act, §§ 10(b), 20(a), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a) (1982)), ajfd mein., 732 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1984); McDaniel v.
Compania Minera Mar de Cortes, 528 F. Supp. 152, 166-67 (D. Ariz. 1981) (plaintiff
must establish that he assessed available information as would reasonable person in his
position possessed with similar business experience, and that he was unaware of any
untruth or omission of fact).
8
E.g., Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1123 (1981); Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977);James v. Du Breuil, 500 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1974); Grumet v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 336 (D.NJ. 1983). But see Nathanson v.
Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (in pari delicto defense not
available to insiders in suit brought by purchasers).
In Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985), the
Supreme Court rejected the in pari delicto defense of securities professionals in a suit
brought by their tippees. The Court based its rejection of the defense on enforcement
considerations. For a discussion of the circumstances in which an in pari delicto defense
may still be valid, see infra note 293.
9
E.g., Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 646 F.2d 721, 727 (2d Cir. 1981); Heizer
Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 332-34 (7th Cir. 1979); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv.,
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action by a number of lower federal courts.10 The United States
Supreme Court had not addressed the relevance of any of these doctrines'" until its decision this year in Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards,
Inc. v. Berner.1 2 By disallowing a defense of in pan' delicto on statutory
enforcement grounds, Bateman plainly signals the now precarious
status of tort law doctrines in rule lOb-5 private actions.
Bateman is the most recent of a series of decisions over the past
decade in which the Court has indicated that the intent of Congress
governs the elements of the rule 10b-5 action.' 3 The Supreme
Court has enumerated several factors that must be considered in
determining congressional intent: the language and history of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5; the structure of the 1934 Act and the
Securities Act of 1933;1 4 the policies underlying both the 1933 and
Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd on opinion below, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
At least one court has questioned the status of contribution under rule lOb-5 following the Supreme Court's decisions in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transportation
Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981) (rejecting contribution under Equal Pay Act, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982), and title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(1982)) and Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (rejecting
contribution under Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982)). See Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668
F.2d 100, 119 n.17 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982). But cf. Noonan v.
Granville-Smith, 532 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y.) (distinguishing Northwest Airlines and Texas
Industries and upholding right of contribution under rule 10b-5), certificatefor interlocutory
appeal granted, 535 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
10 See cases cited supra notes 5-9. Lower court decisions on whether recklessness
may be a basis for liability also illustrate the prominence of tort law in rule 1Ob-5 actions. Several lower courts have accepted recklessness as a basis for liability because of
its sufficiency under common law deceit. See McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1198
(3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024 (6th Cir.
1979); Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 45-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1039 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). See generally infra note 17 (discussing elements of
rule lob-5 private action).
1 1 The Supreme Court has expressly left open the relevance of aiding and abetting
and contribution under rule lOb-5. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191 n.7
(1976) (aiding and abetting); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,
640 n.11 (1981) (contribution); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transportation Workers
Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91-92 n.24 (1981) (same).
Although the Court has never addressed the plaintiffis duty of care, Justice White
dissented in 1977 from the denial of certiorari in a duty of care case. See Dupuy v.
Dupuy, 434 U.S. 911 (1977) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). He maintained that "[tihe Court should take this opportunity to clarify the standard of care expected of plaintiffs in litigation under Rule 1Ob-5." Id. at 912.
12
105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985).
13 See also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 233 (1980); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472, 479 (1977);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
14
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-(mm) (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1933
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1934 Acts; and the elements of deceit under the common law.1 5
This Article has two objectives: first, to examine the Court's
jurisprudence for the rule lOb-5 action; 16 second, to apply the
Court's jurisprudence to the duty of care, a rule lOb-5 doctrine of
common law origin.17 The duty of care requires that the court dis-.
15 In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), for example,
the Court held that a private plaintiff under rule lOb-5 must have purchased or sold the
security in question. The holding was premised on the language of § 10(b), statutory
structure, and statutory policy.
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Court held that rule
lOb-5 does not encompass liability for negligence. The holding was premised on the
language of § 10(b), statutory structure, and legislative history.
In Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), the Court held that rule
lOb-5 liability requires misrepresentation or nondisclosure. The holding was premised
on the language of § 10(b), legislative history, and statutory policy.
In Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Court held that under rule
lOb-5, silence was actionable only if the defendant had a duty to disclose. The Court
premised its holding on common law deceit after finding that the language and history
of § 10(b), as well as statutory policy, were not helpful.
16 A substantially different reading of the Court's jurisprudence has been offered by
Professor Daniel R. Fischel, who claims that the appropriate factors are limited to the
language, structure, and history of § 10(b). See Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section
10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 80, 94 (1981). He specifically rejects
both policy, id. at 100-02, and common law deceit, id. at 94, as relevant factors.
17
See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 108
(5th ed. 1984). See also infra notes 318-29 and accompanying text (discussing status of
duty of care under common law deceit).
The duty of care has repeatedly been held irrelevant to actions brought by the SEC.
See, e.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1015 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977); SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279, 1283 (7th Cir. 1974); SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 84 (2d Cir. 1970); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596
(2d Cir. 1969). Cf. 5C A.JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE lOb-5 § 238.02,
at 10-84 (rev. 2d ed. 1985) (defense of in pari delicto irrelevant to actions brought by
SEC). But see SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1974) (victim's knowledge
held sufficient to defeat action by SEC), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
Under rule lOb-5 a private plaintiff must plead and prove the following elements:
(1) PURCHASER/SELLER REQUIREMENT. The plaintiff must be a purchaser or
seller of a security. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55
(1975).
(2) MATERIALITY. The fact omitted or misrepresented must have been material.
A fact is material "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable . . . [investor]
would consider it important ..
" TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
449 (1976). Although the TSC Industries standard was propounded in the context of
§ 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.§ 78n(a) (1982), and rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9
(1985), it also applies to actions brought under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5. See Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 4 7 4.n..14 (1977) (TSC Industries cited as sole authority for finding of lack of materiality under rule lOb-5); S.D. Cohn & Co. v. Woolf, 426
U.S. 944 (1976) (rule lOb-5 action remanded for reconsideration in light of TSC Industries). See also Abrams v. Oppenheimer Gov't Sec., Inc., 737 F.2d 582, 593 (7th Cir.
1984) (TSC Industries standard applied to rule lOb-5 action); Madison Consultants v.
FDIC, 710 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1983) (same); Simpson v. Southeastern Inv. Trust, 697
F.2d 1257, 1259 (5th Cir. 1983) (same); Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 176 &
n.17 (8th Cir. 1982) (same).
(3) SCIENTER. Defendant must have acted with scienter, defined as an intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
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miss a rule lOb-5 private action when the plaintiff has carelessly ignored information,1 8 relied upon suspicious information, 19 or failed
to seek warranted additional information. 2 0 Every circuit that has
The Supreme Court has not determined whether recklessness is sufficient for liability.
Id. at 194 n.12; Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 378 n.4 (1983).
Lower courts after Hochfelder have held recklessness to be sufficient for liability. E.g.,
Pegasus Fund, Inc. v. Laraneta, 617 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1980); Healey v. Catalyst
Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 1980); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 614
F.2d 418, 440 (5th Cir. 1980). See also cases cited supra note 10.
(4) "IN CONNECTION WITH" REQUIREMENT. The fraud must have occurred
"in connection with" the purchase or sale of a security. See the texts of § 10(b), supra
note 1, and rule lOb-5, supra note 3. See also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (addressing scope of "in connection with" requirement).
(5) RELIANCE. Plaintiff must have relied on the fact that was omitted or misrepresented. Where the fact was omitted, plaintiff's reliance is presumed. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). See Huddleston v. Herman &
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 548 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375
(1983); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1048 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). Cf. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 188-89 (3d
Cir. 1981) ("flexible approach" adopted with respect to presumption of reliance), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982). Courts have relaxed the reliance element when the claim
involves "fraud on the market." See generally Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of
Dispensingwith Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C.L. REv. 435
(1984).
(6) CAUSATION. The injury to the plaintiff must have resulted from the omission
or misrepresentation. Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57,
61 (2d Cir. 1985); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir.
1981), rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040, 1048 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). The causation element is also relaxed
when the claim involves "fraud on the market." See generally Black, supra.
(7) JURISDICTIONAL MEANS REQUIREMENT. The defendant must have used
interstate commerce, the mails, or a facility of a national securities exchange. See supra
notes 1, 3. Cf. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 148 (1972) (affirming district court's holding that defendants made use of jurisdictional means).
18 See, e.g., Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 709 F.2d 1413, 1418
(11 th Cir. 1983) (failure to read contract); Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund,
Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 1975) (failure to examine transfer sheets); Financial
Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 521 (10th Cir.) (inattention to earnings statement), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Lucas v. Florida Power &
Light Co., 575 F. Supp. 552, 570 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (inattention to prospectus); McDaniel
v. Compania Minera Mar de Cortes, 528 F. Supp. 152, 167 (D. Ariz. 1981) (inattention
to available records and information); Kaplan v. Vornado, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 212, 215
(N.D. Ill. 1971) (failure to read debenture).
19 See, e.g., Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1518 (10th Cir. 1983) (reliance
on oral misrepresentations that contradicted memorandum); White v. Sanders, 689 F.2d
1366, 1369 (1lth Cir. 1982) (jury might have reasonably believed that plaintiffs were
reckless in ignoring evidence that should have made them suspicious); Lane v. Midwest
Bancshares Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1200, 1210-11 (E.D. Ark. 1972) (reliance on suspect
balance sheet).
20
See, e.g, City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 231 (8th Cir.) (failure to
seek audit report), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634,
641 (7th Cir. 1963) (failure to investigate discrepancy as to earnings); Altschuler v. Cohen, 471 F. Supp. 1372, 1384 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (allegedly material information could
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considered the duty of care has upheld it,2I albeit under a variety of
names 22 and burden of proof allocations. 23 This Article concludes,
however, that the duty of care is not appropriate to rule 1Ob-5 litiga24
tion and should be rejected.
Part I of this Article traces the development of the duty of care
have been obtained); Caan v. Kane-Miller Corp., [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH)
95,446, at 99,242 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1976) (failure to make inspection of
available documents);Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659, 668-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(failure to conduct warranted additional inquiry), rev'd in part on other grounds, 533 F.2d
826 (2d Cir. 1976); Niedermeyer v. Niedermeyer, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH)
94,123, at 94,500 (D. Ore. Aug. 21, 1973) (failure to conduct thorough
examination of available records).
Other types of carelessness may likewise result in a finding of failure to meet the
duty of care. See, e.g., Fallani v. American Water Corp., 574 F. Supp. 81, 84 (S.D. Fla.
1983) (failure to have contract translated into Italian); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F.
Supp. 1057, 1079 (D. Del. 1976) (failure to retain counsel under other circumstances),
rev'don othergrounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Eichen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 402 F.
Supp. 823, 830-31 (S.D. Cal. 1975) (investigating too quickly); McGraw v. Matthaei, 388
F.Supp. 84, 91 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (investigating minimally).
A plaintiff with knowledge of facts warranting further investigation who fails to investigate does not fulfill his duty of care. This knowledge of facts warranting further
investigation is distinct from knowledge of the fraud itself. Plaintiff's actual knowledge
of the fraud undermines his cause of action for reasons separate from the duty of care.
See Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1051 (7th Cir.) (plaintiff's
knowledge precludes finding that defendant caused damages), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875
(1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 596 (3d Cir. 1976) (plaintiff's knowledge
precludes finding of materiality); Ply-Gem Indus., Inc. v. Green, 503 F.2d 1362, 1365
(2d Cir. 1974) (plaintiff's knowledge defeats rule lob-5 claim); Safecard Servs., Inc. v.
DowJones & Co., 537 F. Supp. 1137, 1143 (E.D. Va. 1982) (plaintiff's knowledge precludes finding of reliance and causation), aff'd mem., 705 F.2d 445 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 831 (1983). But see Stewart v. Bennett, 359 F. Supp. 878, 881 n.9 (D. Mass.
1973) (rule lob-5 "affords no defense on the grounds of plaintiff's knowledge"). See
generally 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD
§ 8.4(650-51) (1984) (plaintiffs knowledge of defendant's fraud precludes finding of
nondisclosure or misrepresentation).
21
See cases cited supra note 7.
22
Other names used in referring to the duty of care include: justifiable reliance,
reasonable reliance, reasonable diligence, and due diligence. See infra notes 31-34 and
accompanying text.
23 The circuits disagree as to whether the plaintiff or the defendant bears the burden of proof concerning the duty of care. See infra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
A distinction exists among those circuits placing the burden on the plaintiff; some circuits impose the burden of proof on the plaintiff in every case, whereas at least one
circuit places the burden of proof on the plaintiff only when the defendant has placed
the plaintiffs care in issue. See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
24
Commentators generally have approved of the duty of care. See Campbell, Elements of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: Scienter, Reliance, and Plaintiff's Reasonable Conduct Requirement, 26 S.C.L. REv. 653 (1975); Wheeler, Plaintif'sDuty of Due Care Under Rule 1Ob-5:
An Implied Defense to an Implied Remedy, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 561 (1976); Note, The Due Diligence Requirementfor Plaintiffs Under Rule 10b-5, 1975 DUKE LJ. 753 (1975); Note, A Comparative Fault Approach to the Due Diligence Requirement of Rule 10b-5, 49 FORDHAM L. REV.
561 (1981); Note, The Due DiligenceDefense in Rule lOb-5: The HochfelderAftershocks, 11 IND.
L. REV. 727 (1978); Comment, Plaintif'sDuty of CareAfter Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 73
Nw. U.L. REV. 158 (1978); Comment, A Reevaluation of the Due Diligence Requirementfor
Plaintiffls in Private Actions under SEC Rule 10b-5, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 904 (1978). But see
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under rule lOb-5. The duty of care was first used to restrict the
scope of rule lOb-5 and originally was applied in only two types of
cases in which the need for limits was especially compelling: claims
premised on the defendant's negligence and claims brought by insiders, corporations, and securities professionals. Although the
25
Supreme Court's decisions in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States
26
and Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder did not address the duty of care
directly, the decisions facilitated expanded application of the doctrine. Part I examines this broader reach and potentially harsher
impact of the present duty of care.
Parts II, III, and IV examine the Supreme Court's rule lOb-5
jurisprudence. Part II begins with the language and history of section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5, including an exploration of the difficulties
in utilizing these factors to determine congressional intent. The
analysis of statutory structure in Part II prompts the conclusion that
the duty of care cannot be reconciled with section 29(a) of the 1934
27
Act.
Part III addresses the underlying policies of the 1933 and 1934
Acts and demonstrates their inconsistency with the policies that
lower courts have advanced to justify the duty of care. Part III
shows that the duty of care is inconsistent with the congressional
policy of statutory enforcement and thereby contravenes the
Supreme Court's decision in Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v.
28
Berner.
Part IV examines common law deceit. In accordance with congressional intent, the relevant deceit standards are those of the most
liberal jurisdictions in 1934.29 In those jurisdictions, a plaintiff's
carelessness did not bar recovery. 30 Thus, rule lOb-5's duty of care
is inconsistent with the common law as well as with statutory structure and policy. As such, it is contrary to the intent of Congress and
should be abandoned.
I
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUTY OF CARE UNDER RULE

lOb-5

3
Whether discussed in explicit terms or as justifiable reliance, '
Note, Abrogation of Plaintifs Due Care Requirement in Private Actions Under Rule 1Ob-5, 28
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 399 (1978).
25 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
26 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
27
Section 29(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982) [hereinafter cited as

section 29(a)].
28
105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985).
29
See infra note 317 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 319-29 and accompanying text.
31 E.g., Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1515-19 (10th Cir. 1983); LTV Fed.
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reasonable reliance,3 2 reasonable diligence,3 3 or due diligence,3 4
courts have applied the duty of care to rule lOb-5 actions involving
both open market3 5 and face-to-face 3 6 transactions. Courts have
even extended the duty of care to class actions.3 7 Face-to-face transactions, however, provide the more common context for litigation of
duty of care issues. Such transactions are more likely to involve inconsistent or otherwise problematical information that a careful investor would be expected to clarify. Accordingly, duty of care issues
are especially likely to arise in transactions involving close corpora40
tions,38 private placements, 3 9 and customer-broker relations.
A.

Early Rule lOb-5 Duty of Care Cases
Courts originally applied the duty of care to rule lOb-5 litiga-

Credit Union v. UMIC Gov't Sec., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 819, 836 (N.D. Tex. 1981), aft'd,
704 F.2d 199 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983).
32
E.g., Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1197 (8th Cir. 1978);
Zucker v. Sable, 72 F.R.D. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Carlisle v. LTV Electrosystems, Inc., 54
F.R.D. 237, 239 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
33
E.g., Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); Meier v. Texas Int'l Drilling Funds, Inc., 441 F. Supp.
1056, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
34
E.g., White v. Sanders, 689 F.2d 1366, 1369 (11th Cir. 1982); Straub v. Vaisman
& Co., 540 F.2d 591, 596 (3d Cir. 1976); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 521 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
35
E.g., Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 515
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Lucas v. Florida Power & Light Co., 575 F.
Supp. 552, 554-55 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Kaplan v. Vornado, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 212, 213
(N.D. Ill. 1971).
36
See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
37
E.g., Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 938 (1982); Lucas v. Florida Power & Light Co., 575 F. Supp. 552 (S.D. Fla. 1983);
Ferland v. Orange Groves, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 690 (M.D. Fla. 1974). See also Dura-Bilt
Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 89 F.R.D. 87, 95-96 (S.D.N.Y. 198 1) (class certification
granted where duty of care regarded as potentially relevant to action); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 77 F.R.D. 685, 695 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (same).
38
E.g., Swenson v. Engelstad, 626 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1980); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551
F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d
687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades,
491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974).
39
E.g., Siebel v. Scott, 725 F.2d 995 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3515 (1984);
Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand,
649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); Goodman v. Epstein, 582
F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979); Spatz v. Borenstein, 513 F.
Supp. 571 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Meier v. Texas Int'l Drilling Funds, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1056,
1063 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Eichen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 402 F. Supp. 823, 830-31 (S.D. Cal.
1975).
40
E.g., Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 709 F.2d 1413 (11th Cir.
1983); Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1978); Straub v.
Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976); Weir v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 63 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
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tion as a way to limit liability. 4' The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
offered an explanation for the perceived necessity of this limitation:
Considered alone, the sweeping language of Rule lOb-5 creates
an almost completely undefined liability. All that the rule requires
for its violation is that someone "do something bad" in connection with a purchase or sale of securities. Without further delineation, civil liability is formless .

. .

. In recognition of this

problem, courts have sought to construct workable limits to liability ....

42

The duty of care was among the "workable limits" identified by the
43
Fifth Circuit.
The early duty of care cases measured the plaintiff's carelessness by a negligence standard.4 4 Courts were divided, however, on
the relation of the duty of care to the other elements of the private
action. 45 Some courts regarded the duty of care as a separate ele47
ment;4 6 other courts subsumed it under the elements of causation,

reliance, 48 or materiality. 4 9 Courts also disagreed about whether to
41
E.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804-05 & n.12 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing
reasonable reliance as one limitation upon "formless" liability under rule lOb-5); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1967) (same); McLean
v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1077 (D. Del. 1976) (duty of care originated "as a
defensive response to the increasing number of private actions brought under lOb-5"),
rev'd on othergrounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979). See also Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540
F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 1976) ("where the basis of a lOb-5 recovery began to broaden
from intentional to negligent conduct, importation of the tort concept of a plaintiffs
contributory negligence was a natural development").
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963), appears to have been the first
rule lOb-5 case to utilize the duty of care concept. In Kohler the Seventh Circuit refused
to hold the defendant liable, in part on the ground that the plaintiff had access to the
information he claimed was misstated. Id. at 640. Other early cases utilizing the duty of
care concept include Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 736-37 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 951 (1968), and Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249, 1254 (E.D. Pa.
1969).
42
Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804-05 (5th Cir. 1970) (citations omitted).
43 Id. at 805 & n.12. Other "limits" were privity, causation, foreseeability, and the
purchaser-seller requirement. Id.
44
E.g., Rochez Bros. Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 409-10 (3d Cir. 1974) (by implication); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 103 (5th Cir. 1970) (by
implication), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d
221, 230 (8th Cir.) (by implication), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
45 See supra note 17 for the elements of a rule lob-5 private action.
46 E.g., Rochez Bros. Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 409 (3d Cir. 1974); Financial
Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 517 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 874 (1973); Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976).
47 E.g., Pollak v. Eastman Dillon, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,987, at 97,408 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1975); Branham v. Material Sys.
Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1048, 1056 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Kaplan v. Varnado, Inc., 341 F. Supp.
212, 215-16 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
48 E.g., Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 585-86 (3d Cir. 1975); City Nat'l
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judge the duty of care subjectively or objectively 50 and whether the
plaintiff or the defendant had the burden of proof.51 These differences were of little consequence during the 1960s and early 1970s,
however, because at that time courts applied the duty of care in only
two categories of rule lOb-5 cases.
The first category of cases applying the duty of care consisted of
those purporting to reject a rule lOb-5 scienter requirement. True
rejection of the scienter requirement did not occur in any circuit
because no court actually imposed liability when scienter was lacking. 52 What may thus far have been overlooked, however, is that in
dismissing claims alleging liability without scienter, courts frequently focused on the plaintiff's lack of care. 53 Indeed, the duty of
care repeatedly served as a basis for dismissal, 54 affirmance of a defendant's verdict, 55 or reversal of a plaintiff's verdict 5 6 in cases in
Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970);
Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735-37 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
49 E.g., Taylor v. Smith Barney & Co., 358 F. Supp. 892, 896 n.11 (D. Utah 1973).
50 Compare City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230 n.10 (8th Cir.) (objective), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970) and Niedermeyer v. Niedermeyer, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,123, at 94,500 (D. Ore. Aug. 21, 1973) (same)
with Bird v. Ferry, 497 F.2d 112, 114 (5th Cir. 1974) (subjective) and Clement A. Evans &
Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1970) (same), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988
(1971) and Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 737 (8th Cir. 1967) (same), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1968).
51 Early cases placing the burden of proof on defendant include Clement A. Evans
& Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971);
Reilly v. Frederick, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,417, at
99,111 (N.D. Ala.Jan. 12, 1976); Branham v. Material Sys. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1048,
1056 (S.D. Fla. 1973). See also Colvin v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 477 F.2d 1283, 1291
n.12 (5th Cir. 1973) (explicitly reserving question whether plaintiff or defendant had
burden of proof).
For cases placing the burden of proof on plaintiff, see supra note 46.
52 E.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 873 (1974); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 286 (3d Cir.)
(Adams, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); Bucklo, Scienter
and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562, 563 (1972); Cox, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: A
Critique and an Evaluation of its Impact upon the Scheme of the Federal Securities Laws, 28 HASTINGS LJ. 569, 570-71 & nn. 5-13 (1977). See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 194 n.12 (1976) (noting that intentional conduct was in fact at issue in most cases
sanctioning negligent liability).
53 Courts have recognized that the duty of care arose to curb liability for nonintentional conduct. See, e.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1019 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 911 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 450 F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 1976). What has
not been recognized, however, is the duty of care's role in insuring that liability for
unintentional conduct was never imposed.
54 E.g., Branham v. Material Sys. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1048, 1056-57 (S.D. Fla.
1973); McGraw v. Matthaei, 388 F. Supp. 84, 91 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Kaplan v. Vornado,
Inc., 341 F. Supp. 212, 215-16 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
55 E.g., Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414,420 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
830 (1974); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 1963).
56 E.g., Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 521
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973). See also Colvin v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co.,
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which scienter was at least formally not required.
The second category of cases applying the duty of care was a
57
limited subgroup of cases in which scienter was expressly at issue:
58
those in which the plaintiff was a securities professional, a corporation, 5 9 or an insider. 60 The Second Circuit explained the rationale
6
for applying the duty of care in these cases: '
The securities laws were not enacted to protect sophisticated
477 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (5th Cir. 1973) (plaintiffis verdict reversed because jury gave
inconsistent answers to questions involving duty of care); White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d
724, 734-36 (9th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff's verdict reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of new rule lOb-5 standards, which include duty of care).
57 Scienter might be at issue either because the court regarded it as an essential
element or because the plaintiff alleged it. CompareJackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp.
659, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (circuit requirement), rev'd in part on othergrounds, 533 F.2d 826
(2d Cir. 1976), with Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970)
(scienter alleged by plaintiff), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
58
E.g., Edwards & Hanley v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478 (2d
Cir. 1979) (brokerage firm), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980); Clement A. Evans & Co. v.
McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970) (same), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
59 E.g., Rodman v. Grant Found., 460 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (bankruptcy
trustee for mercantile chain), aft'd, 608 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1979); NBI Mortgage Inv. Corp.
v. Chemical Bank, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,066
(S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1977) (corporation); Caan v. Kane-Miller Corp., [1975-76 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,446 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1976) (counterclaim of
conglomerate).
60
E.g., Pittsburgh Coke & Chem. Co. v. Bollo, 560 F.2d 1089, 1091-92 (2d Cir.
1977) (insider is corporation);Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(insider is officer and director), rev'd in part on other grounds, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976).
61
Early cases did not explicitly acknowledge the application of the duty of care to
scienter cases involving insiders, corporations, and securities professionals. Some did,
however, implicitly acknowledge it. For example, in Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491
F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), the court held that "before an insider may claim reliance on a
material misrepresentation or nondisclosure, he must fulfill a duty of due care." Id. at
409 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir.
1975), the court held that the "plaintiff, as an 'insider,' had the duty of using due care to
ascertain the relevant facts." Id. at 585-86 (emphasis added). In Frigitemp Corp. v.
Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1975), the court imputed constructive knowledge to the corporate plaintiff but then noted that "[wihether 'constructive
knowledge,' or 'ready access to the information involved,' is always a bar to the plaintiff
we need not decide." Id. at 282 (citation omitted; emphasis deleted). In Myzel v. Fields,
386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968), the court assessed the
justifiable reliance of the insider plaintiff, but not that of the ordinary plaintiff. Id. at
735-37.
Moreover, recent cases have erroneously assumed that the duty of care previously
had no application to scienter cases. See, e.g., Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68,
78 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005,
1019 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977). This error has created interpretative
problems. For example, in Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 911 (1977), the court had difficulty explaining why the duty of care had been invoked in Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 988 (1971), because the McAlpine plaintiff had alleged scienter. 551 F.2d at
1019 n.26. The Dupuy court failed to recognize the significance of the plaintiff's status as
a brokerage firm in McAlpine, preferring instead to cast MeAlpine aside as an "exception."
Id.
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businessmen from their own errors of judgment. Such investors
must, if they wish to recover under federal law, investigate the
information available to them with the care and prudence ex62
pected from people blessed with full access to information.
Accordingly, in many of these cases, courts based their dismissals on
the plaintiff's failure to meet his duty of care. 63 Not all courts accepted the application of the duty of care in these circumstances,

however. Some courts appeared to regard the duty of care as inapplicable to scienter cases, regardless of the plaintiff's identity. 64
They reasoned that carelessness, even where the plaintiff was sophisticated, would not expurgate the defendant's fraud, because

"sophisticated investors, like all others, are entitled to the truth." 65
In cases involving scienter and an unsophisticated plaintiff, lack
of care did not defeat recovery, even when the plaintiff had been on
notice of the need for further inquiry. The Tenth Circuit's decision
in Zabriskie v. Lewis 6 6 illustrates this view. In Zabriskie, the defendants
allegedly orally misrepresented the negotiability of certain stock.
The defendants argued that the legend on the face of the stock certificate had given the plaintiff notice of the stock's non-negotiability. 6 7 The Tenth Circuit refused to impose a duty of care, reasoning
that
[the plaintiff's] reliance on the statements of these two men would
not seem to indicate a lack of diligence but rather ajustifiable reliance. As to her alleged receipt of actual notice from the legend,
the oral statement indicating the stock was negotiable could easily
have satisfied any question the legend raised in the mind of this
68
unsophisticated investor.
62
Hirsch v. Du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 763 (2d Cir. 1977). In Mallis v. Bankers Trust
Co., 615 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981), the court limited the
application of the quoted statement to situations like Hirsch where the plaintiff's actions
are "far beyond negligence." Id. at 79.
63
See cases cited supra notes 58-60.
64 In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Ross, 509 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1975), the court
upheld the omissions claim of a corporate plaintiff that had access to documents containing the allegedly omitted information. Id. at 933.
In Franklin Say. Bank v. Levy, 406 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on othergrounds,
551 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1977), the court entered judgment for the plaintiff bank despite its
president's awareness of the problematic nature of the investment in question. 406 F.
Supp. at 46.
65 Stier v. Smith, 473 F.2d 1205, 1207 (5th Cir. 1973).
66 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974).
67 The legend read:
The shares of Stock represented by this certificate are held for investment
and not for distribution, and cannot be presented for transfer until compliance with the Securities Act of 1933 as amended.
Id. at 552 n.12.
68 Id. at 552-53. See also Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735-37 (8th Cir. 1967) (issue
of justifiable reliance adjudicated as to insider plaintiff, but not as to noninsider plaintiff), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). Cf. Bird v. Ferry, 497 F.2d 112, 114 (5th Cir. 1974)
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Thus, courts invoked the duty of care as a means of curbing the
application of rule lOb-5 69 only when the need for a curb seemed
especially acute. Such situations involved claims premised on the
defendant's negligence 70 and claims brought by certain privileged
71
or sophisticated plaintiffs.
B.

The Supreme Court Speaks By Indirection: Affiliated Ute
and Hochfelder

Prior to Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,7 2 courts often subsumed the duty of care under the element of reliance. 7 3 In Affiliated
Ute, the Supreme Court refused to dismiss the plaintiff's claim
merely because the plaintiff had failed to prove reliance upon material factual omissions:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a
failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite
to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material. .

.

. This obligation to disclose and this withholding of a

74
material fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact.

Affiliated Ute thus recognized the difficulty of establishing reliance upon omitted information. 7 5 The Court relieved the plaintiff of
this burden by placing the burden on the defendant to establish that
the plaintiff had not relied upon the omitted information. 76 The
plaintiff retained the burden of establishing reliance, however, if he
77
alleged misrepresentations rather than omissions.
By eliminating the plaintiff's burden of proving reliance in
omissions cases, the Affiliated Ute Court further complicated the uncertain relationship between reliance and the duty of care. If reli(verdict against broker affirmed despite plaintiff's failure to request receipts or audit
account).
69 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
70
See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
71
See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
72
406 U.S. 128 (1972).
73 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
74 406 U.S. at 153-54 (citations omitted).
75 See, e.g., Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 742 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S.Ct. 814 (1985); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1015 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 911 (1977).
76 E.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 548 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd
in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). See generally Note, The Reliance Requirement in
Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 88 HARV. L. REv. 584 (1975).
77 Where the plaintiff claims an omission as well as a misrepresentation, courts
sometimes presume reliance as to both claims to avoid the necessity of giving two sets of
instructions on reliance. See, e.g., Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 178 n.21 (8th
Cir. 1982); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 188-89 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982). But cf. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 548
(5th Cir. 1981) (plaintiffs not entitled to presumption), rev'd in part on other grounds, 459
U.S. 375 (1983).
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ance subsumed the duty of care, 7 the burden of proof allocations
applicable to reliance would also apply to the duty of care. Thus,
after Affiliated Ute, a plaintiff would have had to prove that he had
met his duty of care in a misrepresentation case but not in an omissions case. 79 Courts could not justify this allocation, however, because proof of the duty of care is not inherently more difficult in
omissions cases than in misrepresentation cases.8 0 Consequently,
most courts after Affiliated Ute separated reliance from the duty of
81
care.
Affiliated Ute thus systematized the relationship between the duty
of care and the other elements of the rule lOb-5 action. The previous uncertainty regarding this relationship probably contributed to
the selective application of the duty of care.8 2 By systematizing this
relationship, Affiliated Ute also facilitated the eventual extension of
83
the duty of care to all private rule lOb-5 actions.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder8 4 further enhanced the status of the
duty of care in rule lOb-5 cases. The Hochfelder Court held that rule
1Ob-5 did not encompass liability for mere negligence.8 5 The Court
held that liability under rule 10b-5 requires scienter, defined as an
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.8 6 The Court expressly
8 7
left open the question of whether scienter embraces recklessness.
By eliminating liability based on the defendant's negligence,
Hochfelder prompted courts to reconsider the relevance of the plaintiff's negligence. 8 Every circuit to reconsider the issue, however,
has reaffirmed the duty of care,8 9 at least in modified form, 9 0 after
78

See supra note 48 and accompanying text.

79

See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1015-16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911

(1977).
80 Courts were unable to identify any other policy that would allocate proof of the
duty of care in accordance with whether the plaintiffs allegations involved omissions or
misrepresentations. See id. at 1016.
81
E.g., id. at 1015-16.
82 E.g., Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 709 F.2d 1413, 1418
(I th Cir. 1983) (reliance is a separate element of plaintiff's case). But cf.Holdsworth v.
Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 695-97 (10th Cir. 1976) (not clearly separating plaintiffs due
diligence from reliance), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
83 See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
84 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
85
Plaintiffs had specifically conceded defendants' lack of scienter. Id. at 190 n.5.
86
Id. at 193.
87
See id. at 194 n.12. See also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 378
n.4 (1983) (question again left open). Lower courts after Hochfelder have upheld the
sufficiency of recklessness. See supra note 17.
88
E.g., Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1123 (1981); Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 559 n.21 (1st Cir. 1978).
89
See cases cited supra note 7. For a discussion of the modified duty of care, see
infra notes 99-124 and accompanying text. As will be shown, most circuits have equated
the modified duty of care with avoidance of recklessness, making the phrase "duty of
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conceding that the preclusion of negligent liability rendered the
duty of care less necessary. 9 1 Courts have premised this reaffirmation on five new justifications for the duty of care: deterrence of
investor carelessness, 92 promotion of anti-fraud policies, 9 3 promotion of market stabilization, 94 "fairness," 9 5 and provision of a causal
link9 6 between the defendant's wrong and the plaintiff's injury. 9 7 By
precipitating recognition of these five new justifications, Hochfelder
fostered the entrenchment of the duty of care under rule lOb-5. 98
care" something of a misnomer. Nevertheless, this Article uses the "duty of care" phraseology throughout.
90 Courts advanced three reasons for modifying the duty of care rather than retaining it intact. First, its necessity diminished after the Supreme Court eliminated liability
for negligence in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See supra notes 8586 and accompanying text.
Second, courts did not perceive the duty of care as a defense to traditional common
law fraud, which they analogized to rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005,
1018-19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687,
694 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977). But cf. Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 1975) (duty of care had been defense to common law fraud). As Part IV of this Article shows, a split of authority existed
among common law courts in 1934 concerning the relevance of the plaintiff's carelessness to deceit actions.
Third, courts believed Congress had attached greater importance to the defendant's
intentional fraud than to the plaintiff's negligence. E.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d
1005, 1019 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977). As Parts II and III of this Article
demonstrate, the issue of the plaintiff's negligence did not concern Congress, and it is
therefore an inappropriate determinant of the scope of rule lOb-5.
91 See, e.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005,1019 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 1976).
92 E.g., Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 1976).
93 E.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977). The theory seems to be that fraud will fail when investors are careful. See id. (by
implication).
94
E.g., id. Apparently, the theory is that greater investor caution will create fewer
market swings. See id. (by implication).
95 E.g., id. The court explained that "fairness" limits access to rule lOb-5 to "those
who have pursued their own interests with care and good faith." Id. See also Weir v.
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 63, 65 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
96
For the elements of a rule lOb-5 private action, see supra note 17.
97
Courts adopting this theory maintain that the injury to a careless plaintiff results
from his own lack of diligence, not from the defendant's fraud. E.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy,
551 F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong,
545 F.2d 687, 695-97 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
For a discussion of the justifications advanced by lower courts to support the duty of
care, see infra notes 259-77 and accompanying text.
98 The perceived anti-plaintiff trend in the Supreme Court's recent rule lOb-5 decisions may have been an unstated justification for retaining the duty of care. Reconsideration of the duty of care in light of Affiliated Ute and Hochfelder occurred principally
between 1976 and 1980, see supra note 7, a time when the Supreme Court was restricting the scope of rule lob-5. E.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (silence
actionable only where defendant has duty to disclose); Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462 (1977) (liability requires manipulation or deception); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (private plaintiff must be purchaser or seller of
security). But cf. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985)
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Duty of Care Cases After Affiliated Ute and Hochfelder

Duty of care cases after Affiliated Ute and Hochfelder have attempted to relax the pre-Hochfelder negligence standard. 9 9 The relaxed standards, all of which are applied subjectively,1 0 0 have taken
several forms.' 0 ' The Second, 10 2 Fifth, 0 3 Tenth, 0 4 and Eleventh10 5 Circuits measure the duty of care by a recklessness standard,
with the burden of proof on the plaintiff.'0 6 The Seventh Circuit
also uses a recklessness standard, 0 7 but the burden of proof ap(rejecting in pari delicto defense of securities professionals in rule lOb-5 action brought
by their tippees); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380-87 (1983) (rule
lOb-5 and § 11 of 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982) are cumulative remedies).
99 For why the standard was relaxed rather than retained intact, see supra note 90.
100 E.g., Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1197 (8th Cir. 1978);
Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 696-97 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977);
Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976). None of these cases acknowledged that previously some courts had applied the duty of care objectively. See
supra note 50 and accompanying text.
101 At least one district court has puzzled over whether the standards are interchangeable. See American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 74647 (E.D. Va. 1980).
102
E.g., Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1123 (1981); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F. Supp. 1314,
1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
103
E.g., Gower v. Cohn, 643 F.2d 1146, 1156 (5th Cir. 1981); Paul F. Newton & Co.
v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1122 (5th Cir. 1980); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551
F.2d 1005, 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977).
The First Circuit has indicated its approval of the Fifth Circuit standard but has not
itself addressed the appropriate standard for the duty of care. See Xaphes v. Merrill
Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 692, 694-95 (D. Me. 1985). One district court in the Ninth Circuit also has endorsed the Fifth Circuit standard. See Sullivan
v. Chase Inv. Servs., Inc., 79 F.R.D. 246, 262 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
104
E.g., Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983) (recklessness
standard); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 696 (10th Cir. 1976) (burden of proof
on plaintiff), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
105
E.g., Friedlander v. Nims, 571 F. Supp. 1188, 1197 (N.D. Ga. 1983), afd, 755
F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1985); Gaskins v. Grosse, [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH)
99,105, at 95,277 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 31, 1983).
106 See cases cited supra notes 102-05. None of these cases explains why the plaintiff
should carry the burden of proving the duty of care rather than the defendant.
In the Second Circuit, the plaintiff must prove that he exercised due care only if the
defendant places the plaintiff's care in issue. Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68,
79 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981). In the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits,
however, the plaintiff must meet this burden of proof in every case. Dupuy v. Dupuy,
551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); White v. Sanders, 689
F.2d 1366, 1369 (1 1th Cir. 1982). This difference is significant. Compare Fallani v.
American Water Corp., 574 F. Supp. 81, 84 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (granting motion to dismiss
for failure to allege plaintiff's lack of recklessness) with Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507
F. Supp. 1225, 1234 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (denying motion to dismiss for failure to allege
lack of recklessness).
107
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1048 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). Although the Sundstrand court stated that nonfulfillment of
the duty of care requires " 'gross conduct somewhat comparable to that of defendant,' "
id. (quoting Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
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pears to be on the defendant.' 0 8 The standard of care in the Third
Circuit is reasonableness, 10 9 and the defendant bears the burden of
proof."t0 Although the Third Circuit standard resembles negligence, it is more lenient than those pre-Hochfelder cases that required the plaintiff to prove a lack of negligence."'
Despite these modifications, the post-Hochfelder duty of care potentially has a much harsher impact on plaintiffs than its predecessor. First, the post-Hochfelder duty of care has a much wider scope.
Before Hochfelder, courts ordinarily applied the duty of care only
when the defendant lacked scienter 1 2 or when the plaintiff was a
securities professional, corporation, or insider. 1 13 After Hochfelder,
the duty of care applies to the claims of all types of investors.1 4 For
U.S. 955 (1977)), the court equated this standard with recklessness in the next paragraph. Id. The rationale for this equation appears to be that a plaintiff's recklessness
makes him comparable to the defendant because the defendant can be found liable for
reckless conduct. Id. at 1047-48. See also Spatz v. Borenstein, 513 F. Supp. 571, 585
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (equating lack of care with recklessness).
When a particular defendant acts intentionally, however, the question arises as to
whether he is comparable to a plaintiff who acts recklessly. Compare Zobrist v. Coal-X,
Inc., 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983) (reversing judgment in favor of a reckless plaintiff
and against defendant who acted intentionally) with id. at 1520 (Holloway, J., dissenting)
(reckless plaintiff should be entitled to recover from defendant who acts intentionally).
108 See, e.g., J.H. Cohn & Co. v. American Appraisal Assocs., 628 F.2d 994, 998 (7th
Cir. 1980); Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 405 & n.47 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 939 (1979); Bruce v. Rosenberg, 468 F. Supp. 777, 779 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
None of these cases addresses the reasons for placing the burden on the defendant
rather than on the plaintiff.
109
E.g., Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 194 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 938 (1982); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976).
11o E.g., Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976). The Third
Circuit offered the following conclusory justification for placing the burden of proof on
the defendant: "the failure to meet. . . [the duty of care] standard is in the nature of an
affirmative defense." Id. at 598.
111
See supra note 46 and accompanying text; see also Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005,
1017-18 (5th Cir.) (explaining Third Circuit's action in shifting burden of proof from
plaintiff to defendant as relaxation of duty of care standard), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977).
112
See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
113
See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
114
Claims of insiders, corporations, and securities professionals that have been dismissed for nonfulfillment of the duty of care include Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co.,
688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982) (insiders) and McDaniel v. Compania Minera Mar de Cortes, 528 F. Supp. 152 (D. Ariz. 1981) (same). See also Hendrickson v. Westland Mineral
Corp., 463 F. Supp. 826 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (failure to allege care by liquidator of business
entities). Cf. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1121-22
(5th Cir. 1980) (duty of care of plaintiff broker to be decided upon retrial).
Nonfulfillment of the duty of care also has resulted in the dismissal of the claims of
plaintiffs who were not insiders, corporations, or securities professionals. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 709 F.2d 1413 (11th Cir. 1983); Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983); White v. Sanders, 689 F.2d
1366 (11 th Cir. 1982). Cf. Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 405-06 (7th Cir. 1978)
(duty of care to be decided at trial), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979). See also Siebel v.
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example, courts have recently dismissed claims of a businessman," 15
a physician, 1 6 and citizens of Italy' 1 7 for failing to satisfy the duty of
care.
The post-Hochfelder duty of care also has a harsher impact than
its predecessor when the plaintiff has notice of the need for further
inquiry. Before Hochfelder, notice did not defeat the claim of an ordinary investor if the defendant acted with scienter. 1 8 After
Hochfelder, notice is sufficient to defeat an ordinary investor's claim,
as the Tenth Circuit's decision in Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc. 19 illustrates.
In Zobrist a purchaser of an interest in a limited partnership claimed
that he was given oral assurances that the investment was "no
risk" 1 20 after he challenged the defendants' assertions that the investment was a "sure thing" and "couldn't miss."' 12 1 The trial court
entered judgment against the defendants. The Tenth Circuit reversed, imputing to the plaintiff knowledge of a private placement
memorandum which contained a statement of risks. 12 2 The court
concluded that even if the plaintiff had not read the memorandum
before investing,' 23 the plaintiff had been reckless to rely on the defendants' oral assurances given their inconsistency with the
24
memorandum.'
The reach and impact of the duty of care in rule lOb-5 litigation
Scott, 725 F.2d 995, 1000 (5th Cir.) (district court's finding of sufficient care not clearly
erroneous, although a "close" question), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3515 (1984).
A few of the foregoing cases were brought by individual plaintiffs with financial
sophistication. See, e.g., Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1517 (10th Cir. 1983).
Such cases illustrate the duty of care's expansion because they were not brought by
insiders, securities professionals, or corporations.
Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 709 F.2d 1413 (l1th Cir.
115
1983).
116
Meier v. Texas Drilling Funds, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1056 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
117
Fallani v. American Water Corp., 574 F. Supp. 81 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
118
See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
119 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983). See also White v. Sanders, 689 F.2d 1366 (11th
Cir. 1982). In White plaintiffs were purchasers of corporate notes that subsequently became worthless. They alleged that the defendant had misrepresented the safety of the
notes as well as his own impartiality. The trial court entered judgment notwithstanding
the verdict for the plaintiff. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the jury
reasonably might have found the plaintiffs "reckless in ignoring certain circumstantial
evidence that should have made them suspicious." Id. at 1369. Cf. Siebel v. Scott, 725
F.2d 995, 1001 n.5 (5th Cir.) (court declined to charge plaintiffs with knowledge of statement contained in their prospectuses because defendant's testimony called into question truth of statement), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3515 (1984).
120
708 F.2d at 1516.
121
122

Id. at 1514.
Id. at 1518.

123
Id. at 1514. The plaintiff had, however, signed an agreement acknowledging that
the investment was subject to risks set forth in the memorandum. Id.
124
The court held that the plaintiff should not have relied on the defendants' oral
assurances without "further inquiry." Id. at 1519.
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has expanded enormously after Hochfelder. Parts II, III, and IV of
this Article offer a framework for evaluating this expanded doctrine.

THE ELEMENTS OF RULE

II
10b-5:

LANGUAGE, HISTORY, AND
STATUTORY STRUCTURE

The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the intent
of Congress governs the elements of the rule 10b-5 action. The
Court measures this intent by the following factors: the language
and history of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the structure of the
1933 and 1934 Acts, the policies underlying both those Acts, and
the elements of deceit under the common law. 125 The duty of care
must be evaluated in accordance with this framework.
A.

The Language of Section 10(b)

The Supreme Court's rule 10b-5 analysis begins with the language of section 10(b): 126 "[W]e turn first to the language of [section] 10(b), for '[t]he starting point in every case involving
construction of a statute is the language itself.' ",127 Statutory language has nevertheless been of limited usefulness to the Court. The
language of section 10(b) has provided partial support for some ele129
ments, such as scienter 128 and the purchaser-seller requirement.
Statutory language fails, however, to offer a basis for other elements, such as a duty to disclose in cases challenging the defend13 0
ant's silence.
Three principal difficulties arise in inferring the elements of
rule 10b-5 from the language of section 10(b). First, the wording of
125

126
127

See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
For the text of § 10(b), see supra note 1.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (quoting Blue Chip

Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)). See
also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (analysis of rule lOb-5 action
should begin with language of § 10(b)).
128 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (deriving scienter requirement from language and history of § 10(b) and also from statutory structure).
129 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (deriving purchaser-seller requirement from language of § 10(b), statutory structure, and statutory
policy).
130
See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 n.9, 233 (1980) (reversing conviction because duty to disclose, as developed under common law and incorporated into
§ 10(b), does not exist outside fiduciary relationship). ChiefJustice Burger dissented in
Chiarella because he considered the duty to disclose requirement to be consistent with
the language of § 10(b), which encompasses "any person engaged in any fraudulent
scheme." Id. at 240 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Other rule lob-5 decisions not predicated upon the language of § 10(b) include
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (tippee liability) and Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (establishing appropriate standard of proof in private
action).
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section 10(b) is imprecise and susceptible to alternative readings.
The Court's analysis in Hochfelderx3 l is illustrative. In holding that
rule 1Ob-5 requires scienter, the Court relied upon the words " 'manipulative or deceptive' . . . in conjunction with 'device or contrivance.' "132 The Court first attempted to infer the intent of
Congress from the 1934 dictionary definitions of "manipulative,"
"device," and "contrivance." 1 33 The Court failed to note, however,
that in the history of the 1934 Act, "device" was used synonymously
with "practice," a word that does not necessarily support an inference of scienter.13 4 The Court also attempted to confer special importance upon the word "manipulative," which it deemed "a term
of art [in the securities field] . . .connot[ing] intentional or willful
conduct." 35 In doing so, the Court apparently overlooked the fact
that the words "manipulative" and "deceptive" are "expressed in
136
the disjunctive, and each should be given its separate meaning."'
Indeed, the Hochfelder Court appeared to concede that it could
not ground the scienter requirement solely on the language of section 10(b). After announcing that the clarity of the language made
"further inquiry. . . unnecessary,"1 37 the Court nonetheless sought
additional support for its conclusion in the legislative history of the
1934 Act. 138 The Court made a similar concession in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green.' 3 9 After deeming the language of section 10(b) to
be "dispositive" of the matter at issue,1 40 the Sante Fe Court pro14 1
ceeded to examine policy considerations.
Another difficulty in drawing inferences from the language of
section 10(b) is uncertainty over whether this language reflects the
intent of Congress in the prima facie case only or in affirmative de425 U.S. 185 (1976).
Id. at 197. The Court also inferred a scienter requirement from the words "[t]o
use or employ." Id. at 199 n.20.
133 Id. at 199 nn.20-21 (quoting WEBSTER'S INTERNATONAL DICTnONARY (2d ed.
1934)). The Court did not seek a dictionary definition for "deceptive," a word that
characterizes the consequences of the defendant's acts, not his state of mind. Cox, supra
note 52, at 575.
134 Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 707 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934)).
135 425 U.S. at 199.
136
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 707 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
137 425 U.S. at 201.
138 Id. at 201-06.
139 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
140
Id. at 477. The issue in Santa Fe was whether liability under rule lob-5 could be
premised on conduct not involving misrepresentation or nondisclosure. The Court held
that misrepresentation or nondisclosure was essential to liability under rule 1Ob-5. Id. at
474-77. See also Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 2458 (1985) (misrepresentation or nondisclosure held essential to liability under § 14(e) of the 1934 Act).
141
430 U.S. at 477-80.
131
132
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fenses as well. Even in the wake of Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc.
v. Berner,142 the Court's first rule lOb-5 decision involving an affirmative defense, 143 this difficulty remains unresolved. In Bateman the
Court does not address the lack of support for the in pari delicto defense in the language of section 10(b). 14 4 Possibly, the Court chose
not to refer to the language of section 10(b) because it regarded this
language as relevant to the prima facie case only.
A third difficulty pertains solely to the private action. Inferring
from section 10(b)'s language elements unique to private actions
may be inappropriate because Congress in 1934 did not consider
private actions under section 10 (b). 145 The Bateman Court may have
failed to look to the language of section 10(b) since the affirmative
defense at issue pertains only to private actions. 146 This private action difficulty also may account for the Court's reasoning in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor DrugStores, 147 which held that under rule 1Ob-5
private plaintiffs must be either purchasers or sellers. Although the
Court found support for the purchaser-seller requirement in the
words "in connection with the purchase or sale,"' 14 8 as well as in the
defeat in 1957 and 1959 of proposed amendments which would
have added the phrase "any attempt to purchase or sell," statutory language did not provide the ultimate basis for its decision: 14 9
[W]e would by no means be understood as suggesting that we are
able to divine from the language of [section] 10(b) the express
105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985).
The Court's major rule lOb-5 decisions are Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983)
(tippee liability); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (right to cumulative remedies under rule lob-5 and § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982), and appropriate
standard of proof in rule lOb-5 private action); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (SEC
must prove scienter as element of rule 1Ob-5 action); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222 (1980) (defendant lacking duty to disclose does not violate rule lOb-5 by his silence); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (conduct not actionable
under rule lob-5 absent misrepresentation or nondisclosure); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter required in rule lOb-5 private action); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (private plaintiff must have
purchased or sold securities to recover under rule lOb-5); Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972)(plaintiff alleging omissions need not prove reliance); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (scope
of "in connection with" requirement).
144
Cf. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp. 412 F.2d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting defenses of inparidelicto and unclean hands partly because they are
not set out in language of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5).
See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
145
146 See 5C A. JACOBS, supra note 17, § 238.02, at 10-84.
147 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
148
Id. at 733.
149 Id. at 732-33 (emphasis in original) (quoting S.2545, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 103
CONG. REC. 11,636 (1957); S. 1179, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in SEC Legislation:
Hearings on S.1178, S. 1179, S. 1180, S. 1181, and S.1182 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68 (1959)).
142

143
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"intent of Congress" as to the contours of a private cause of action under Rule lOb-5. . .. [I]t would be disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1942 foreordained the present state of the law
with respect to Rule lOb-5.150
The Court was somewhat more reluctant in Blue Chip than in
Hochfelder' 5 ' or Sante Fe' 5 2 to rely upon statutory language because
only in Blue Chip did the questioned element pertain exclusively to
the private action.
The above analysis supports the conclusion that the Court regards the language of section 10(b) as an important starting point
but not the sole factor in interpreting rule 10b-5. Other factors become especially important if the questioned element involves either
the private action or an affirmative defense.
Determining the appropriateness of the duty of care must,
therefore, begin with the language of section 10(b). Even allowing
for the imprecision of that language, nothing in section 10(b) suggests that a defendant might avoid liability because of the victim's
carelessness. On the contrary, the entire provision is directed at the
defendant's fraudulent activity; the possibility that the plaintiff
might have averted the fraud is not discussed.
The duty of care should not be rejected, however, for lack of a
basis in the language of section 10(b) because that language alone
does not reliably indicate congressional intent about the duty of
care. First, the duty of care is an element unique to private actions, 153 which were not considered by Congress in 1934.154 Second, the duty of care is just as plausibly an affirmative defense as an
element of the plaintiff's case. 155 If Congress intended section 10(b)
to convey only the elements of the prima facie case, and if Congress
intended the duty of care to be an affirmative defense, one would
not expect to find the duty of care in section 10(b).
B.

History of Section 10(b)
The Supreme Court has consistently identified section 10(b)'s

150 Id. at 737. Statutory policy was the ultimate basis for the decision. See id. at 73749. Justice Powell concurred "to emphasize the significance of the texts of the Acts of
1933 and 1934 and especially the language of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5." Id. at 755 (Powell, J., concurring).
151 See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
See supra note 17.
154
See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
155
The disagreement between the circuits supports the fact that this ambiguity exists. See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
152
153
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history as an appropriate basis for interpreting rule 1Ob-5. 156 As the
Court has acknowledged, 15 7 however, that history is extremely limited. Indeed, Congress gave scant attention to section 10(b)15 8 and
completely failed to consider section 10(b) private actions. 159 Only
two substantive references to section 10(b) appear in the legislative
history. One is a statement from the Senate Report that section
10(b) is "aimed at those manipulative and deceptive practices which
have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful function."1 60 The other
is a statement from the House Hearings by Thomas Corcoran,
speaking for the drafters:
Subsection (c) [later section 10(b)] says, "Thou shalt not devise
any ...

cunning devices."

. . .Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to prevent
manipulative devices [sic] I do not think there is any objection to
that kind of a clause. The Commission should have the authority
16 1
to deal with new manipulative devices.
Section 10(b)'s history has, consequently, seldom provided a
basis for the Court's rule lOb-5 decisions.' 6 2 Although the Court
63
attempted to rely upon this history in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,1
the attempt was not persuasive. To uphold the scienter requirement, the Court purported to find support in Corcoran's references
156
E.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 & n.13 (1977); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976).
157
See, e.g, Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 n.13 (1977); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-06 (1976).
158 Only two substantive references to § 10(b) appear in the legislative history of the
1934 Act. See infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
The legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts is assembled in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES Acr OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
159 The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress did not contemplate private
actions under section 10(b). E.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 729 (1975).
160
S.REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HisTORY, supra note 158, item 17, at 6.
161
"Stock Exchange Regulation," Hearingson H.R. 7852 & H.R. 8720 Before the House
Interstate & Foreign Commerce Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934), reprinted in 8 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 158, item 23, at 115.
162
E.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1983) (legislative

history provided no specific basis for determining standard of proof in rule lOb-5 private action); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (legislative history
provided no direct help in determining whether silence is actionable absent duty to disclose); Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 & n.13 (1977) (legislative history did not specifically address whether conduct can be actionable absent
misrepresentation, deception, or nondisclosure). But cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 732-33 (1975) (support for purchaser-seller requirement
inferred from defeat in 1957 and 1959 of amendments that would have added to § 10(b)
the words "attempts to purchase or sell").
163
425 U.S. 185, 201-06 (1976).
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to "manipulative" and "cunning" devices.' 64 The Court then relied
upon portions of congressional reports that are of questionable relevance 16 5 because they are not directed at section 10(b). 1 66 Indeed,
the Court underscored the probable irrelevance of these reports
when it observed that "Congress fashioned standards of fault...
on a particularized basis"' 16 7 and "[a]scertainment of congressional
intent with respect to the standard of liability created by a particular
168
section. . . rest[s] primarily on the language of that section."'
Although analyzing legislative history is an obvious means of
discovering congressional intent, the history of section 10(b) is so
limited as to be virtually useless in most instances. This history perhaps is least useful when the questioned element is unique to the
private action and therefore not even contemplated by Congress.' 6 9
Thus, for example, legislative history provided no basis for determining the appropriateness of the in pari delicto defense in Bateman
t 70
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner.
Nothing in the history of section 10(b) suggests that Congress
was concerned about investor carelessness. 17 1 This lack of concern
is an insufficient basis for rejecting the duty of care, however, because it may have resulted from Congress's failure to consider private actions.
C.

The Language and History of Rule lOb-5

The Court has repeatedly signaled that rule lOb-5 is governed
not only by the language 172 and history 173 of section 10(b), but also
Id. at 203. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
Cox, supra note 52, at 581.
166 425 U.S. at 204-06. The Court conceded that the portions relied upon had not
been directed specifically at section 10(b). See id. at 204.
167 Id. at 200.
168 Id. Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
239 (1980) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) illustrates the limited usefulness of § 10(b)'s history. The ChiefJustice relied upon the statement from the Senate Report that § 10(b)
was aimed at "practices which . . . fulfill no useful function," see supra note 160 and
accompanying text, in concluding that the silence of someone with material inside information should be actionable without a duty to speak because such silence "serves no
useful function." Id. at 241. This reasoning fails to recognize that conduct serving no
useful function is impossible to identify with specificity.
169 See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
170 105 S.Ct. 2622 (1985).
171 See generally S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-13 (1934), reprintedin 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 158, item 17, at 2-13; H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 2-16 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 158, item 18, at 2-16.
At least one case upholding the duty of care has acknowledged that the legislative
history offers no affirmative support for the duty of care. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d
1005, 1019 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977).
172 See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
173
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
164
165
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by the language1 7 4 and history 175 of the rule itself. Although reliance upon administrative interpretation of statutes is widely accepted, 17 6 such reliance is particularly appropriate here because
Congress expressly provided in section 10(b) for the promulgation
of rules by the SEC. 17 7 Unfortunately, the language and history of
rule lOb-5 are not especially informative. The brief history consists
of a short release, 78 a paragraph in the SEC's 1942 annual report, 17 9 and the subsequent recollections of an SEC staff attorney. 180 Moreover, issues unique to private actions cannot be
meaningfully inferred from the rule's language and history because
the SEC gave no consideration to private actions.' 8 '
The language and history of rule lOb-5 can help only if they do
not expand the scope of section 10(b) in ways prohibited by Con174
See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748-49 (1975);
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972). See also Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240-41 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (language of rule
lOb-5 supports broad scope of application). For the text of rule 10b-5, see supra note 3.
175 E.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 & n.7 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 & n.32 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 736 n.8 (1975).
176 See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
177
For the text of § 10(b), see supra note 1.
178
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942), reprintedin 5 A.
JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5 § 5.02, at 1-128 (1980). The release prefaces the
text of the rule as follows:
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the
adoption of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection with the
purchase of securities. The previously existing rules against fraud in the
purchase of securities applied only to brokers and dealers. The new rule
closes a loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the
Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase. The text of the Commission's action follows:
The Securities and Exchange Commission, deeming it necessary for
the exercise of the functions vested in it and necessary and appropriate in
the public interest and for the protection of investors so to do, pursuant
to authority conferred upon it by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
particularly Sections 10(b) and 23(a) thereof, hereby adopts the following
Rule X-1OB-5 ....
Id.
179
8 SEC ANN. REP. 10 (1942). Entitled "[riule for additional protection to investors," the paragraph states only as follows:
During the fiscal year the Commission adopted Rule X-10B-5 as an
additional protection to investors. The new rule prohibits fraud by any
person in connection with the purchase of securities, while the previously
existing rules against fraud in the purchase of securities applied only to
brokers and dealers.
Id.
180 See Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 921-22
(1967) (remarks of Milton Freeman). Freeman explained that the commissioners upon
approving rule lOb-5 simply commented, "[W]e are against fraud, aren't we?" Id. at
922.
181 See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
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gress. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,18 2 for example, the Court rejected an argument against scienter predicated on subsections (b)
and (c) of the rule.18 3 After conceding that these subsections might
by themselves embrace liability without scienter,18 4 the Court ruled
that the scope of rule lOb-5 "cannot exceed the power granted the
Commission by Congress under [section] 10(b)."' 8 5 The Hochfelder
Court did not foreclose the possibility, however, that the scope of
rule lOb-5 could be narrower than that of section 10(b).
Neither the language' 8 6 nor the history 8 7 of rule lOb-5 provides support for the duty of care. The language of the rule, like
that of the statute under which it was promulgated, 8 8 exclusively
addresses the defendant's fraud, not the possibility that under different circumstances the fraud might have been averted. 8 9 Moreover, nothing in the history of rule lOb-5 demonstrates that the SEC
was concerned about investor carelessness. 190 The remaining factors require further investigation because the absence of support
from the administrative language and history may be attributable to
SEC inattention to private actions.
D.

Statutory Structure

The Supreme Court has identified statutory structure as a basis
for interpreting rule lOb-5.19' The Court's concern with statutory
structure has three aspects: (1) language, (2) express remedies, and
(3) other sections providing inferences about section 10(b).
1. Language
The Court has interpreted section 10(b) by contrasting its language with the language of other sections of the 1933 and 1934
182
183

425 U.S. 185 (1976).
Id. at 212-14.

Id. at 212.
Id. at 214.
186
Cf. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1967)
(conceding that language of rule does not require reasonable reliance); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804-05 (5th Cir. 1970) (same).
187
See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
188
For the text of § 10(b), see supra note 1.
189 If rule lob-5 did provide for a duty of care, its scope would be narrower than that
of § 10(b). This result would be consistent with the Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
191
E.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,'206 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 (1975). See also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659
(1983) (interpreting § 10(b) by reference to § 20(b) of 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b)
(1982)).
184
185
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Acts.' 92 The Court has, however, failed to recognize that these contrasts sometimes lack meaning, as the Court's decision in Blue Chip
93
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores illustrates.1
In Blue Chip Stamps the Court upheld the purchaser-seller requirement in private actions under rule lOb-5, based in part on the
contrasting language of section 16(b),' 9 4 which expressly authorizes
private actions by plaintiffs who have neither purchased nor sold.' 95
The Court noted that section 10(b) contains no comparable authorization for private actions and concluded that "[w]hen Congress
wished to provide a remedy to those who neither purchase nor sell
securities, it had little trouble in doing so expressly."' 9 6 The Court
thus implied that section 10(b) reflected an affirmative congressional decision to deny standing to those who were not purchasers
or sellers.
This reasoning fails to consider the most plausible explanation
for the difference between section 16(b) and section 10(b). Under
section 16(b) Congress expressly provided for private actions and
therefore had to identify the appropriate private plaintiff. In contrast, Congress did not contemplate private actions under section
10(b); 1 9 7 hence, Congress had no occasion to identify the appropriate private plaintiff. The purpose of contrasting the language of
section 10(b) with the language of other sections is to clarify Congress's choice of words in section 10(b). These contrasts are least
valuable when they involve matters not considered by Congress in
drafting section 10(b): elements unique to the private action' 98 or
not a part of the prima facie case. 199
In contrast to section 10(b), three sections of the 1933 Act expressly impose a "duty of care." One imposes the duty on the plainSee, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206-11 (1976); Blue Chip
192
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733-36 (1975).
193
421 U.S. 723 (1975).
194
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982) [hereinafter cited as section 16(b)].
195 Section 16(b) provides in relevant part:
[A]ny profit realized by [a beneficial owner, director, or officer] from any
purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such
issuer . . . within any period of less than six months, . . . shall inure to
and be recoverable by the issuer. . . . Suit to recover such profit may be

instituted. . . by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer
in the name and in behalf of the issuer. ...
Id.
196 421 U.S. at 734. The Court also gave weight to the contrast between the " 'in
connection with the purchase or sale' of securities" language from § 10(b) and the " 'in
the offer or sale' of securities" language from § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 7 q
(1982). Id. at 733-34.
197
See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
198
See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
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tiff,20 0 and two impose it on the defendant.20 ' Section 11,202 an
express remedy for fraud in a registration statement, provides the
defendant with a defense if he "had, after reasonable investigation,
reasonable ground to believe and did believe . . . that the state-

ments therein were true. ' 20 3 Similarly, section 12(2),204 an express
remedy for fraud in prospectuses and communications, provides the
defendant with a defense if he "did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known of [the fraud]." ' 205 Section
13,206 the statute of limitations for actions under section 11 and section 12(2), allows actions to be brought within one year after discovery of the fraud "should have been made by the exercise of
reasonable diligence." 20 7 These three sections indicate that ConSee infra note 206 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text. Imposing a duty of care manifests
Congress's willingness to penalize carelessness expressly, regardless of whether the duty
is imposed on the plaintiff or the defendant.
202
Section 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982) [hereinafter cited as section
11].
203
Section 11(b) provides a defense for a nonexpert defendant concerning the portion of the registration statement not prepared by an expert. It reads as follows:
[N]o person, other than the issuer, shall be liable as provided therein
who shall sustain the burden of proof200
201

(3) that (A) as regards any part of the registration statement not
purporting to be made on the authority of an expert, and not purporting
to be a copy of or extract from a report or valuation of an expert, and not
purporting to be made on the authority of a public official document or
statement, he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to
believe and did believe, at the time such part of the registration statement
became effective, that the statements therein were true and that there was
no omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading ....
Id.
204
1933 Act § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982) [hereinafter cited as section 12(2)].
Section 12(2) reads as follows:
Any person who-

(2) offers or sells a security . . . by means of a prospectus or oral
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who
shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him
Id.

Id.
1933 Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1982) [hereinafter cited as section 13]. Section
13 reads in pertinent part: "No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created
under [§ 11] or [§ 12(2)] of this title unless brought within one year after the discovery
of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made
by the exercise of reasonable diligence .
" Id.
207
Id.
205
206
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gress did not hesitate to penalize carelessness expressly, and therefore, it is arguable that its failure to do so in section 10(b) was
intentional.
The problem with this argument is that the language of section
10(b) may not reliably reflect congressional intentions concerning
the duty of care. The duty of care is unique to private actions, which
Congress did not consider. 20 8 In addition, the duty of care may be
an affirmative defense rather than a part of the prima facie case. 2 09
Section 10(b) may be exclusively addressed to the prima facie
case. 2 10 The absence of a duty of care from section 10(b), therefore,
may imply nothing about congressional intent. Given this possibility, it would seem imprudent to attach significance to contrasts between section 10(b) and sections 11, 12, and 13.
Sectional comparisons as to the duty of care, however, are far
from meaningless. The express remedies 21 1 do not impose a duty
of care on the plaintiff. 2 12 The absence of a plaintiff's duty of care
from the express remedies indicates that Congress did not regard
the duty of care as an inevitable component of a private action.
2.

Express Remedies

The Court has sought to avoid interpretations of rule lOb-5
that would nullify the express remedies and thereby ostensibly violate congressional intent. 2 13 The Court's decisions in Ernst & Ernst
See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
The circuits presently are divided on whether the duty of care is a defense or an
element of the plaintiff's case. See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
210
See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
211 Section 11 and § 12(2) are the express remedies for fraud under the 1933 Act.
Section 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1982) [hereinafter cited as section 9(e)], and section 18,
15 U.S.C. § 78r (1982) [hereinafter cited as section 18], are the express remedies for
fraud under the 1934 Act.
212 Section 11 merely provides a defense that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of
fraud. See, e.g, Martin v. Hull, 92 F.2d 208, 210 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 726
(1937); McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 96 F.R.D. 357, 362 (N.D. Cal. 1982). See generally
A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 20, at 327 (actual knowledge must be shown
to establish defense of plaintiff's knowledge under § 11).
Similarly, there is no duty of care under § 12(2). See, e.g., Sanders v.John Nuveen &
Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1229 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981); Hill York
Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 696 (5th Cir. 1971). Instead, the
plaintiff need only establish lack of actual knowledge of the fraud. See, e.g., Junker v.
Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1361 (5th Cir. 1981).
Section 18 merely requires that the plaintiff establish a lack of actual knowledge. See
generally A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 20, at 464.
Section 9(e) does not prohibit an action even where the plaintiff has actual knowledge of the defendant's fraud. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION
1053 (1983).
213 See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1983); Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208-11 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 736 (1975).
208
209
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v. Hochfelder 2 14 and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 2 15 illustrate

this analysis. In Hochfelder the Court focused on the absence of a
scienter requirement in sections 11 and 12(2) in holding that rule
lOb-5 requires scienter. 21 6 The Hochfelder Court observed that sections 11 and 12 contain procedural barriers not present in section
10(b). 2 17 The Court reasoned that if rule lOb-5 did not require scienter, plaintiffs would cease using sections 11 and 12(2), thereby
nullifying those causes of action and their accompanying procedural
barriers. 21 8 Similarly, in Blue Chip Stamps, the Court upheld the purchaser-seller requirement in part because all of the express remedies were limited to purchasers and sellers: "It would indeed be
anomalous to impute to Congress an intention to expand the plaintiff class for a judicially implied cause of action beyond the bounds it
delineated for comparable express causes of action. '21 9
Although the impact on the express remedies is a factor to consider when interpreting rule lOb-5, the Court has indicated that a
marginal negative impact on the express remedies that is short of
nullification ought not to affect interpretation of the rule. In Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston2 20 the Court held that conduct actionable
under section 11 could be actionable under rule lOb-5 because
there was no risk of section I l's nullification. 2 2 1 The Court offered
no objection to possible reduced utilization of section 11 resulting
from giving plaintiffs a choice between section 11 and rule 1Ob-5.
Eliminating the duty of care under rule lOb-5 would not nullify
the express remedies. Eliminating rule lOb-5's duty of care would
merely achieve equalization because none of the express remedies
imposes a duty of care on the plaintiff.2 22 Rule lOb-5 and the express remedies would still retain virtually all their present advantages and disadvantages. For example, unlike sections 11 and 12(2),
rule lOb-5 would still require scienter, but it would lack the proce214
215
216

425 U.S. 185 (1976).
421 U.S. 723 (1975).

217

Id. at 209-10. These procedural barriers, set forth in § 11 (e), apply at the district

See 425 U.S. at 208-09.

court's discretion and include the posting of a bond at the start of the action and assessment of costs at the end of the action. See id.
218 Id.at210-11.
219
421 U.S. at 736.
220
459 U.S. 375 (1983).
221
Id. at 382-84. Another reason that the Huddleston Court held § I Iand rule lOb-5
to be cumulative remedies was that "the two provisions involve distinct causes of action
and were intended to address different types of wrongdoing." Id. at 381. Section 11
"was designed to assure compliance with the disclosure provisions of the Act by imposing a stringent standard of liability on the parties who play a direct role in a registered
offering." Id. at 381-82 (footnotes omitted). Rule lOb-5, in contrast, is a "catchall"
fraud provision requiring scienter. Id. at 382.
222
See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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dural barriers of those sections. 22 3 Elimination of the duty of care
might increase the use of rule 1Ob-5 and concomitantly decrease
utilization of the express remedies. This possibility, however, is
highly speculative and by no means constitutes nullification.
3.

Other Sections ProvidingInferences About Section 10(b)

The Supreme Court has examined other statutory sections capable of providing inferences about section 10(b).224 In Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,22 5 for example, the Court assessed the
purchaser-seller requirement in light of section 28(a), 2 26 which lim2 27
its recovery in any 1934 Act private action to "actual damages."
The Court found the purchaser-seller requirement consistent with
section 28(a) on the ground that a purchaser or seller would more
easily establish actual damages than would a person who is
neither. 2 28 Similarly, in Dirks v. SEC2 29 the Court held a ban on tippee trading consistent with section 20(b). 23 0 Because section 20(b)
makes illegal violations of the 1934 Act committed "through or by
means of any other person," 2 3' the Court reasoned that it outlawed
23 2
trades by tippees that benefit insiders.
The duty of care cannot be reconciled with section 29(a) of the
1934 Act. 23 3 In recognition of the weak relative bargaining position
of investors, 234 section 29(a) voids "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or
223
See supra note 217 and accompanying text. Nor does it appear likely that eliminating the duty of care under rule lOb-5 would significantly affect the largely ignored
§ 9(e), described by Professor Loss as "no bargain." See L. Loss, supra note 212, at
1052. Nor would it affect the likewise ignored § 18, described as no better than common law deceit. See id. at 1055.
224
See infra notes 225-32 and accompanying text.
225
421 U.S. 723 (1975).
226
Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982) [hereinafter cited as
section 28(a)]. Section 28(a) reads in pertinent part: "no person permitted to maintain
a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall recover. . . a total amount
in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of." Id.
227
Id.
228
421 U.S. at 734-35. The Court also found the purchaser-seller requirement consistent with § 29(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982) [hereinafter cited as
section 29(b)]. The Court noted that § 29(b), which makes contracts in violation of the
1934 Act voidable, is sometimes mentioned as a justification for implying a private action under § 10(b), "[b]ut that justification is absent when there is no actual purchase or
sale of securities, or a contract to purchase or sell ....
421 U.S. at 735.
229
463 U.S. 646 (1983).
230 Section 20(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (1982) [hereinafter cited as
section 20(b)]. Section 20(b) reads as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, to do any act or thing which it would be unlawful for such person
to do under the provisions of this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder through
or by means of any other person." Id.

231

Id.

232

463 U.S. at 659.
Section 29(a), supra note 27.
Even sophisticated investors are protected by § 29(a). Cf. Esposito v. Sweeney,

233
234
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provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder." 23 5 As
the Supreme Court explained in connection with the parallel 1933
236
Act provision:
[T]he Securities Act was drafted with an eye to the disadvantages
under which buyers labor. Issuers of and dealers in securities
have better opportunities to investigate and appraise the prospective earnings and business plans affecting securities than buyers.
It is therefore reasonable for Congress to put buyers of securities
23 7
covered by that Act on a different basis from other purchasers.
Section 29(a) reflects the judgment that penalizing investors for
their own mistakes is less important than prosecuting the Act's violators. Under section 29(a), for example, an investor retains his
1934 Act rights if a purchase contract provision 238 has waived them,
No. 80 C 2861 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 1982) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file)
(voiding under § 29(a) a contractual provision of nonreliance notwithstanding plaintiffis
alleged sophistication); Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766, 772 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (noting that broker-dealers are protected by 1933 Act provision that parallels
§ 29(a)).
235
Section 29(a), supra note 27. Justice White has suggested that the words "waive
compliance with any provisionof this chapter" in § 29(a) are "literally inapplicable" to private rule lob-5 actions, because such actions were judicially implied rather than created
by Congress. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1244 (1985)
(White, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Lower courts have not adopted Justice
White's position. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 234. Assuming that Justice White's
position were adopted someday by the Court, assessment of the duty of care by reference to § 29(a) would remain appropriate. Section 29(a) would still reflect the intent of
Congress and thereby provide a basis for inferring the sort of private action Congress
might have constructed under § 10(b) had it considered such actions. A contrary conclusion would suggest that statutory structure is irrelevant to interpreting rule lOb-5
private actions.
236 The parallel 1933 Act provision is § 14 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982)
[hereinafter cited as section 14]. Section 14 reads as follows: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with
any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall
be void." Id.
237
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953). In Wilko an agreement to require arbitration was voided pursuant to § 14.
The only substantive comment in the legislative history concerning § 29(a) was that
the section was "taken verbatim out of the Securities Act." Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.), S. Res. 56 & S. Res. 97 (73d Cong.) Before the Senate Banking

and Currency Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6578 (1934), reprintedin 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 158, item 22, at 6578 (statement of Thomas Corcoran, spokesman for drafters). The history of the 1933 Act, however, is silent concerning the scope of § 14. See
generally Federal Securities Act 1933: Hearings on H. 4314 Before the House Comm. of Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATYE HISTORY,
supra note 158, item 20, at 17-19, 110, 147-48, 170, 222; Securities Act 1933: Hearingson
S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), reprinted
in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 158, item 21, at 86-87, 175, 277.
238 E.g., Thomas v. Duralite Co., 386 F. Supp. 698, 730 n.13 (D.N.J. 1974), affd
mern., 559 F.2d 1209 (3d Cir. 1977); Special Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Balto, 325 F. Supp.
1185, 1187 (D. Minn. 1971).
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even if the waiver was intentional. 239
Section 29(a) is not, however, limited to waivers of the right to
sue. Investors who contractually acknowledge nonreliance are
nonetheless entitled to prove reliance in court. In Rogen v. Ilikon
Corp.,24 0 for example, a sales contract acknowledged that the plaintiff and his father were "fully familiar with the business and prospects of the corporation, [were] not relying on any representations
or obligations to make full disclosure with respect thereto, and [had]
24 1
made such investigation thereof as they deem[ed] necessary."
The defendant argued that this acknowledgment established nonreliance as a matter of law. The First Circuit rejected the argument:
[W]e see no fundamental difference between saying, for example,
"I waive any rights I might have because of your representations
or obligations to make full disclosure" and "I am not relying on
your representations or obligations to make full disclosure."
Were we to hold that the existence of this provision constituted
the basis (or a substantial part of the basis) for finding non-reliance as a matter of law, we would have gone far toward eviscerat24 2
ing Section 29(a).
Thus, Congress effectively has eliminated waiver of unmatured
243
claims in order to maximize the efficacy of the securities acts.
Although section 29(a) does not by its terms prohibit the duty
of care and duty of care determinations typically do not involve
waivers, 244 section 29(a) and the duty of care nonetheless have antithetical underlying philosophies. By safeguarding even deliberately
waived claims, section 29(a) recognizes the informational advantage
of securities defendants over securities plaintiffs and places the
highest value upon enforcement of violations. The duty of care, on
the other hand, compromises enforcement in order to penalize in239
E.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1143 (2d Cir. 1970) (dictum), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Special Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Balto, 325 F.
Supp. 1185, 1187 (D. Minn. 1971); Perfect Photo, Inc. v. Grabb, 205 F. Supp. 569, 572
(E.D. Pa. 1962); Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. Walet, 104 F. Supp. 20, 24 (E.D. La.
1952), a]J'd, 202 F.2d 433, 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953).
Matured claims, however, may be intentionally waived. E.g., Goodman v. Epstein,
582 F.2d 388, 402 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979); Neuman v. Pike, 456
F. Supp. 1192, 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd in part on othergrounds, 591 F.2d 191 (2d Cir.
1979). But cf Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 398 F. Supp. 609, 624 (D. Md. 1975) (finding
section 29(a) to require caution as to waiver defenses to matured securities claims), afd
on other grounds, 542 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1976).
240
361 F.2d 260 (Ist Cir. 1966).
241
Id. at 265.
242
Id. at 268 (footnote omitted). See also Esposito v. Sweeney, No. 80 C 2861 (N.D.
Ill. May 13, 1982) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) (contractual provision
of nonreliance does not establish nonreliance as matter of law).
243
Meyers v. C & M Petroleum Producers, Inc., 476 F.2d 427, 429 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 829 (1973).
244
See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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vestor carelessness. Congress's enactment of section 29(a) strongly
suggests that had Congress addressed section 10(b) private actions,
it would have decisively rejected the duty of care.
III
ELEMENTS OF RULE lOb-5: STATUTORY POLICY

The Supreme Court has consistently looked to the underlying
policies of the 1933 and 1934 Acts in interpreting rule lOb-5. 24 5

Only once has the Court found language, structure, and history sufficiently dispositive to make considering policy unnecessary. 24 6 The
Court has, moreover, provided guidelines for the identification and
application of relevant policies.
The first guideline is that only policies with demonstrable importance to Congress can be used to interpret rule lOb-5. The
Court's decision in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green 24 7 offers an illustration. In limiting rule lOb-5 to conduct involving misrepresentation or nondisclosure, the Court rejected an argument that rule
lOb-5 embraced all security-related "unfairness. ' 248 Reasoning that
the principal purpose of the 1934 Act was " 'to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor,' ",249 the
Court concluded that "once full and fair disclosure has occurred,
the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential
concern of the statute. ' 250 Similarly, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores,2 5 1 the Court applied the policy of curbing vexatious litigation only after establishing the importance of that policy to
25 2
Congress.
The Court's second guideline is that conflicting policies must
be balanced against each other. In Blue Chip, for example, the Court
evaluated the purchaser-seller requirement in terms of two conflicting policies: curbing vexatious litigation and protecting worthy
plaintiffs. In the Court's view, the purchaser-seller requirement
245
E.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622, 2631
(1985); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,477-80 (1977); Blue Chip Stamps v.

Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737, 740-41, 748-49 (1975).

246 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976). In Sante Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), the Court first suggested that policy considerations might be superfluous, see id. at 477, but nonetheless proceeded to examine policy, see id. at 477-80. In Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Court
attempted to derive a relevant policy from the legislative history but was unsuccessful.
See id. at 233 (no evidence of congressional support for general prohibition against trading on inside information).
-247 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
248

Id. at 477.

249

Id. (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)).

250

Id. at 478.

251

421 U.S. 723 (1975).

252

Id. at 740-41.
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curbed vexatious litigation by facilitating pre-trial dismissal of all actions except those where the plaintiffs "actually purchased or actually sold, and whose version of the facts is therefore more likely to
be believed by the trier of fact." 2 5 3 On the other hand, the Court
found the purchaser-seller requirement to be at variance with protection of those few plaintiffs who are neither purchasers nor sellers,
but are actually injured by fraud.254 The Court concluded that the
value of curbing vexatious litigation outweighed the harm of barring
2 55
recovery to these plaintiffs.
Finally, the Court has viewed the absence of an identifiable statutory policy as potentially implying congressional endorsement of
established legal principles. An illustration is provided by the
Court's decision in Chiarella v. United States,25 6 which held that silence is not actionable absent a duty to speak. The Court reasoned
that a contrary holding required "recognizing a general duty between all participants in market transactions to forego actions based
on material, nonpublic information." 2 57 Such a duty, the Court observed, "departs radically from the established [tort] doctrine," and
hence "should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of
258
congressional intent."
The Court's guidelines for identifying and applying statutory
policy supply the appropriate context for examining the policies advanced by lower courts in justification of the duty of care. These
guidelines are also helpful in analyzing the conflict between the duty
of care and the policy of enforcing section 10(b).
A.

Policies Advanced By Lower Courts in Justification of the
Duty of Care

Lower courts have attempted to justify the duty of care on the
basis of five policies: (1) deterrence of investor carelessness, (2)
promotion of anti-fraud policies, (3) fairness, (4) promotion of market stabilization, and (5) provision of a causal link between the defendant's fraud and the plaintiff's injury. An analysis of each of
these policies reveals that none survives scrutiny.
Id. at 743.
Id.
See id. The danger of abuse from oral testimony was an additional reason to
avoid vexatious litigation. Id. at 743-44.
The duty of care does not further the policy of curbing vexatious litigation. Unlike
the question of whether the plaintiff actually bought or sold, the question of the plaintiff's care is a jury question not resolvable by pre-trial motion. Greenwald v. Integrated
Energy, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 65, 70 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (collecting cases).
256 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
257
Id. at 233.
258 Id.
253
254
255
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1. Deterrence of Investor Carelessness
At least one federal appellate court has asserted that the duty of
care is necessary to deter investor carelessness. 2 59 Nothing in the
history of the 1934 Act, however, suggests that Congress intended
to penalize careless investors. 260 Congress was concerned with penalizing the perpetrators of fraud, not its victims. 26 1 The policy of
deterring investor carelessness, therefore, does not justify the duty
of care. Nor can the duty of care be justified on the ground that it
was a firmly entrenched principle of common law deceit in 1934
which Congress endorsed by not affirmatively rejecting. In 1934
common law jurisdictions were divided as to the appropriateness of
2 62
a duty of care in deceit actions.
2. Promotion of Anti-Fraud Policies
A federal appellate court has suggested that the duty of care
promotes anti-fraud policies, apparently on the theory that fraud
will fail when investors are careful. 2 63 This suggestion is unsound.
The argument assumes that fraud is most appropriately addressed
through vigilance by victims of fraud rather than by prosecution of
defrauders. The entire thrust of the 1933 and 1934 Acts is contrary
to this position. Congress chose to regulate and impose penalties
on defrauders as the most effective means of eliminating fraud. 264
3.

Fairness

"Fairness" is said to require a duty of care that limits access to
rule lOb-5 to "those who have pursued their own interests with care
and good faith." 2 65 This position is without merit. In Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,26 6 the Supreme Court specifically rejected fairness
as a basis for interpreting rule lOb-5. 26 7 Even if fairness is relevant,
it does not justify the duty of care. Fairness by no means requires
absolving blameworthy defendants in order to penalize careless
259

See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
See generally S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1934) (addressing necessity for legislative action), reprintedin 5 LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, supra note 158, item 17, at
2-4.
262
See infra notes 318-25 and accompanying text.
263
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
264
See generally S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprintedin 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 158, item 17.
265
Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977);
see also Weir v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 63, 65 (S.D. Fla.
1984) (denying motion to dismiss because Dupuy standard not met).
266
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
267 See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
260
261
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plaintiffs. More plausibly, fairness requires penalizing the wrongdoer, despite the sloppiness of his victim.
4.

Stabilizing the Markets

The duty of care is said to stabilize the markets, ostensibly on
the theory that greater investor caution will result in fewer market
swings. 2 68 This claim is without merit. Imposing a duty of care on
investors will have little effect on market stability because the duty
of care issue is litigated largely in the context of close corporations 26 9 and private placements,2 7 0 where no public market exists to
be stabilized.
5.

Causation

Some courts have maintained that the duty of care is necessary
to establish causation, 2 7' on the theory that injury to a careless
plaintiff results from his own lack of diligence, not from the defendant's fraud. 272 This position is unsound. Causation is not an absolute concept; rather it "is used. . . to identify those pressure points
that are most amenable to the social goals we wish to accomplish." 2 73 At present, one pressure point is the plaintiff's recklessness. 274 Previously, the analogous pressure point was the plaintiff's
negligence. 27 5 Neither point is fixed; the pressure point is simply
the factor in the chain of causation that is most amenable to change
and will serve to avoid the unwanted result. 27 6 Causation might just
as easily be limited to actual reliance: as long as the plaintiff in fact
relied on the fraudulent misrepresentation or omission, the fraud
27 7
should be deemed to have caused the plaintiff's injury.
B.

The Policy of Enforcing Section 10(b)

In Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner,2 78 the Supreme
Court held that enforcement considerations constitute a significant
policy against which to interpret rule lOb-5. Enforcement considerations, the Court held, are fully applicable to implied private federal
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
For the elements of a rule 10b-5 private action, see supra note 17.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essayfor Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U.
CHi. L. REv. 69, 106 (1975).
274
See supra notes 102-05, 107 and accompanying text.
275
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
276
Calabresi, supra note 273, at 106.
277
The plaintiff still would carry a significant burden of proof. See infra notes 330-31
and accompanying text.
278
105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985).
268
269
270
271
272
273
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securities actions. Such actions were said to serve as a " 'necessary
supplement to Commission action.'"279 The Court might have
noted further that Congress at least implicitly has ratified the enforcement function of private actions by never affirmatively prohib28 0
iting them.
Bateman was an action by tippees against their tippers. The
plaintiffs, ordinary investors, charged that a corporate insider and a
broker deliberately provided them with material nonpublic information that was false. Following losing trades based on this information, the plaintiffs sued under rule lOb-5. The defendants relied
upon the in pari delicto defense: 28 ' they argued that by trading on
nonpublic information, the plaintiffs had become securities law violators and were therefore not entitled to sue. The Supreme Court
rejected the defense because of enforcement considerations and the
28 2
defendants' greater culpability.
The Court outlined a two-prong test to determine when to permit the defense. The defendant must prove that (i) the plaintiff and
the defendant had been equal participants in the violation at issue,
and (ii) dismissal of the action "would not significantly interfere
with the effective enforcement of the securities laws and protection
of the investing public." 28 3 The Court initially sought to determine
279 Id. at 2628 (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)); see also
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689 (1980) ("Another facet of civil enforcement is a private
cause of action for money damages."); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (same).
280 Cf. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1983) (inferring
congressional approval of cumulative remedies under 1933 and 1934 Acts from Congress's failure to bar those remedies in face of repeated judicial endorsements).
281 In pari delicto is Latin for "of equal fault." BLACK'S LAW DIcanONARY 711 (5th ed.
1979).
The typical pleading situation that gives rise to [such] cases involves receipt of a complaint demanding damages followed by defendant's motion
to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's own conduct bars his recovery.
Sometimes the defendant asserts an in pari delicto defense, sometimes he
claims that the plaintiff has unclean hands, and sometimes he maintains
that the plaintiffis contributorily negligent. Regardless of the defendant's
description, defendant is claiming that the law will not allow the pot to
call the kettle black.
Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In
PariDelicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 659 n.282 (1972). See
generally id. at 659-64.
282 105 S.Ct. at 2628.
283 Id. at 2629. Lower courts previously had applied a virtually identical standard
for the in pari delicto defense in rule 1Ob-5 actions. E.g., Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615
F.2d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981); Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co.,
515 F.2d 591, 604 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated on othergrounds, 426 U.S. 944 (1976); Schick v.
Steiger, 583 F. Supp. 841, 845 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
There were three views as to the appropriate application of the standard. Under
one view, the standard could never be met; tippers were precluded as a matter of law
from invoking the defense. According to this view, the tipper inevitably is more blame-
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the relative culpability of the parties under the first prong. This
finding, however, is closely linked to the goal of the second prong
because the relative culpability of the parties largely determines
whether allowing the defense in a given case furthers effective enforcement of the securities laws. 2 84 Thus, although enforcement
concerns are the express focus of the second prong, they are implied in the first prong as well. Indeed, enforcement is no better
served by disallowance of the defense than by allowance when the
2 85
plaintiff and the defendant are equally culpable.
Applying the first prong, the Court held that insiders and brokers who tip are more culpable than their tippees, at least absent
special circumstances. While conceding that the plaintiffs "may well
worthy than the tippee, because the tipper "is at the fountainhead of the confidential
information" and possesses the capacity to wreak greater harm. Nathanson v. Weis,
Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Moreover, maintaining the
action conferred greater benefit to the investing public: "If the prophylactic purpose of
the law is to restrict the use of all material inside information until it is made available to
the investing public, then the most effective means of carrying out this policy is to nip in
the bud the source of the information, the tipper." Id. See Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.,
412 F.2d 700, 706 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J., dissenting) ("The best way to stop the
misuse of confidential material is to discourage the insider-tipster from making the initial disclosure which is the first step in the chain of dissemination."); Moholt v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 451 (D.D.C. 1979) (broker's greater culpability bars
use of in pari delicto defense).
A second view focused upon the particular circumstances, rather than upon tippers
and tippees collectively. Under this view, the defense was disallowed when the plaintiff's
illegal role was tangential to the conspiracy, see Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds,
Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1182 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983),
but allowed when the plaintiff's role was central to the conspiracy, see James v. Du Breuil,
500 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1974). Moreover, even when the plaintiff's violations were
equal in magnitude to the defendant's, the defense could still be disallowed if to do so
were consistent with enforcement considerations specific to the case. For example, the
defense was denied to a defendant who issued private placements because "[tihe private
action. . . arguably occupies an even more important place in the area of private placements than in other areas of Securities Act enforcement where activities of an issuer
must both be reported to and approved by the S.E.C." Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 521
F.2d 225, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 426 U.S. 944
(1976). Cf. James v. Du Breuil, 500 F.2d 155, 160 (5th Cir. 1974) (defense allowed
partly because public was not implicated directly in transaction).
Under the third view, tippers apparently could always invoke the defense. Courts
adopting this view regarded tippers and tippees as equally blameworthy; the lawsuit between them was said to amount to an "accounting between joint conspirators." Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 703 (5th Cir. 1969). Moreover, courts viewed
allowing the defense to be more beneficial to the investing public because disallowance
provided tippees with a virtual warranty. If the tip was not profitable, the tippee simply
could sue the tipper. Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1163-64 (3d Cir.),
cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 705 (5th Cir.
1969).
For a discussion of the status of the in paridelicto defense after Bateman, see infra note
293.
284
105 S.Ct. at 2632.
285
Cf. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 146
(1968) (White, J., concurring).
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have violated the securities laws,"' 2 86 the Court noted that "there are
important distinctions between the relative culpabilities of tippers,
' 28 7
securities professionals, and tippees in these circumstances.
First, the Court observed that because a tippee's liability is "solely
derivative" from the tipper,2 88 the tippee usually is less culpable.
Second, the Court noted that insiders and brokers who tip may commit additional offenses not committed by their tippees, such as vio289
lating fiduciary duties owed the issuer and defrauding the tippee.
Such offenses, according to the Court, are "particularly egregious
290
when committed by a securities professional."
Applying the second prong, the Court held that under the cir291
cumstances dismissal of the action would thwart enforcement.
Noting the SEC's scarce resources, the Court pointed out that if tippees could not sue tippers for fraud, many violations would remain
unprosecuted. 29 2 The Court reasoned that by permitting tippees'
actions against brokers and insiders, the "sources" of inside infor293
mation, insider trading would be deterred.
Although Bateman addressed only the in pani delicto defense, the
decision applies equally to other common law doctrines. If this defense is subordinate to enforcement considerations, there is no principled basis for preventing subordination of other common law
doctrines that are antithetical to enforcement.
Common law doctrines that foster statutory enforcement may
be retained. In American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v.
Hydrolevel Corp.294 the Court upheld the defendants' antitrust liability based on a common law "apparent authority" theory. 2 95
105 S.Ct. at 2631.
Id. at 2630.
Id. (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983) and Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980)).
289
Id.
290 Id.
291
Id. at 2631.
292
Id. at 2631-32.
293
Id. at 2632. The Court also observed that securities professionals were more apt
to be cognizant of possible penalties than ordinary investors. Thus, imposing penalties
on professionals instead of investors would be more likely to have a deterrent effect. Id.
The Bateman Court did not foreclose the possibility that the in pan delicto defense
might be appropriate under different circumstances. Id. at 2632. What those circumstances might be, however, is not clear. For example, the Court did not indicate when
the tippee and tipper will be deemed to be securities law violators of equal magnitude.
Perhaps the most obvious possibility would be a suit by a subtippee against his tippee
where neither is a securities professional. It is also uncertain what sorts of other enforcement considerations might warrant disallowance of the defense assuming that the
plaintiff's violations were equivalent to the defendant's. Id. at 2632 n.30 (question expressly left open).
294
456 U.S. 556 (1982).
295
Id. at 570.
286
287
288
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Although American Society was an antitrust case, it applies to securi-

2 96 and Bateman 29 7
ties cases as well. Indeed, both American Society
relied upon Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. InternationalParts Corp.,298 an
antitrust decision that the Bateman court held "appl[ied] with full
force" to implied federal securities actions. 29 9 In Perma Life the
Court rejected an in paridelicto defense as inconsistent with statutory
enforcement. 30 0 By endorsing application of tort law only so long
as it bolsters statutory enforcement, American Society provides a corollary to Perma Life and Bateman. The American Society Court
explained:

In the past, the Court has refused to permit broad commonlaw barriers to relief to constrict the antitrust private right of action. It stated [in Perma Life] that "the purposes of the antitrust
laws are best served by insuring that the private action will be an
ever-present threat" to deter antitrust violations. In Perma Life
.. . the Court honored that purpose by denying defendants the
right to invoke a common-law defense (the doctrine of in pari
296 Id. at 569-70.
297 See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
298 392 U.S. 134 (1968). Lower courts previously had relied upon Perma Life when
confronted with an in paridelicto defense under rule lOb-5. See, e.g., cases cited supra note
283. Regardless of whether these courts accepted or rejected the defense, Perma Life was
identified as the applicable precedent. Compare Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d
1152, 1164 (3d Cir.) (finding in pari delicto defense applicable), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965
(1977) andJames v. Du Breuil, 500 F.2d 155, 160 (5th Cir. 1974) (same) with Nathanson
v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 56 n.30 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (rejecting in pari
delicto defense).
299 105 S. Ct. at 2629. The Court equated the enforcement goals of private securities actions with those of antitrust actions, despite the fact that treble damages are available only in antitrust actions. Cf. Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp.
50, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (noting unavailability of treble damages to private securities
plaintiffs). One commentator has dismissed this distinction on the ground that antitrust
plaintiffs are accorded treble damages in part to counteract the threat of later retaliation
by defendants with whom they often share a market. See Note, The Demise of In PariDelicto
in Private Actions Pursuant to Regulatory Schemes, 60 CAUF. L. REv. 572, 573 n.6, 590 n.96
(1972).
300
In Perma Life, the plaintiff Midas Muffler dealers alleged that their dealership
agreements with Midas and its affiliates violated the antitrust laws. Defendants advanced
an in pari delicto defense, arguing that the plaintiffs were co-participants in the agreements, and were therefore not entitled to recover. In a five opinion decision, the Court
rejected the defense. All five opinions stressed the importance of statutory enforcement. See 392 U.S. 134, 138-40 (opinion of Court); id. at 145 (White, J., concurring); id.
at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring in result); id. at 151 (Marshall, J., concurring in result); id.
at 154-55 (Harlan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Writing for the Court,
Justice Black noted that "fastidious regard for the relative moral worth of the parties
would . . . seriously undermin[e] the usefulness of the private action as a bulwark of
. . . enforcement." 392 U.S. at 139. He did not, however, endorse rejecting the in pari
delicto defense in all circumstances. Instead, he reserved judgment as to its appropriate
application when the plaintiff's conduct was active and voluntary: "We need not decide
. . . whether . . . truly complete involvement and participation in a monopolistic
scheme could ever be a basis . . . for barring a plaintiff's cause of action." Id. at 140.
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delicto) that was inconsistent with the antitrust laws. In this case,
we can honor the statutory purpose best by interpreting the antitrust private cause of action to be at least as broad as a plaintiff's
right to sue for analogous torts ....301
Under Bateman, Perma Life, and American Society, enforcement consid-

erations must govern application of all other rule lOb-5 tort law
30 2
doctrines, including the duty of care.
Evaluated in light of enforcement considerations, the duty of
care doctrine does not withstand scrutiny.3 0 3 The duty of care requires that courts dismiss the claims of careless plaintiffs who have
not themselves violated rule 10b-5. Defendants in these actions,
however, have violated rule 10b-5. Dismissing suits against violators in order to penalize nonviolators undermines the enforcement
of section 10(b), in direct violation of Bateman, PermaLife, and American Society.
IV
THE ELEMENTS OF RULE 10b-5: COMMON LAW DECEIT

The Supreme Court has accorded common law deceit a limited
role in interpreting rule 10b-5. The common law is relevant only
when the factors discussed above are inconclusive. The Court has
disregarded common law deceit principles where the statute's language, history, structure, or policy are dispositive. In Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores30 4 the Court adopted the purchaser-seller
requirement even though the common law did not require that the
aggrieved party in a deceit action be a purchaser or a seller. 30 5 The
Court found that statutory language, structure, and policy gave suf456 U.S. at 569 (citations omitted).
The principal lower court application of Pema Life to rule lOb-5 has involved the
in pan delicto defense. See supra note 283. A few courts, however, have suggested that
Perma Life may be relevant to all rule lOb-5 common law defenses. See, e.g., Hughes v.
Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 534 F.2d 156, 184 (9th Cir.) (Trask, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is
a clear trend in the law today to limit severely, if not abolish altogether, traditional common law defenses in securities and anti-trust actions, where considerations of public
policy often outweigh whatever balance in equities the court finds between the individual litigants .... Availability of common law defenses, such as in pai delicto, assumption
of risk, equitable estoppel, and waiver serve to make [the statutory] check upon abuses
in the system's internal workings considerably less potent."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896
(1976); Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 521 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that tension between "traditional equitable defenses" and policies served by private rights of
action under federal securities laws have yet to be resolved by the Supreme Court).
303
The circuits presently are split concerning whether the duty of care is a defense
or an element of the plaintiff's case. See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text. Bateman applies in either instance, however, because the duty of care remains a barrier to
relief of common law origin, regardless of the burden of proof.
304 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
301

302

305

Id. at 744.
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30 6
ficient affirmative support to the purchaser-seller requirement.
The Court has turned to the common law of deceit, however,
when the statutory factors are inconclusive. For example, in
30 8
Chiarella v. United States3 0 7 the Court found statutory language,
30
9
3
10
legislative history,
and statutory policy
unhelpful in resolving
whether silence is actionable absent a duty to speak. Under these
311
circumstances, the Court turned to the common law of deceit,
which regarded a duty to speak as a necessary element for silence to
be actionable. 3 12 The Court characterized this common law principle as "established doctrine" 3 13 and refused to follow the post-1934
3 14
trend in the common law identified by the dissent.
The Court's reliance upon common law deceit when other criteria are inconclusive is consistent with congressional intent. Congress intended the federal securities laws to "rectify perceived
deficiencies in the available common-law protections." 3 15 According to the House Report on the 1934 Act:
If investor confidence is to come back ... I the law must advance. As a complex society so diffuses and differentiates the financial interests of the ordinary citizen that he has to trust others
and cannot personally watch the managers of all his interests as
one horse trader watches another, it becomes a condition of the
very stability of that society that its rules of law and of business
practice recognize and protect that ordinary citizen's dependent
3 16
position.
Thus, section 10(b) should be interpreted no more restrictively than
the common law deceit action of that time period unless Congress
has indicated to the contrary. Moreover, Congress's determination
that common law protections were deficient suggests that in the face
of divided common law opinions, the most liberal common law
3 17
views of 1934 should govern.

Id. at 733-49.
445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) ("[N]either the legislative history nor the statute itself
affords specific guidance for the resolution of this case.").
308
Id.
309
Id. at 233.
306
307

310

Id.

Id. at 227-28 & n.9.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 247-48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
315
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)). See also 1 A. BROMBERG & L.
LOWENFELS, supra note 20, § 2.7(1) (concluding that Congress intended rule lOb-5 to be
less burdensome than analogous common law causes of action).
316 H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGIs ,IvE
HISTORY, supra note 158, item 18, at 5 (emphasis added).
317 This appears to be Professor Loss's view. See L. Loss, supra note 212. at 812
311
312
313
314
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Evaluating rule 1Ob-5's duty of care by reference to the common law deceit action may be superfluous in view of the inferences
available from the statute's structure and policy. Nevertheless, the
common law deceit action provides yet another ground for rejecting
the duty of care. Although some common law deceit cases decided
around 1934 imposed a duty of care, 318 a number of others did
not.3 19 Buckley v. Buckley 3 20 is illustrative of the latter group. In
Buckley the trial court entered judgment against the defendant for
fraud in the sale of stock and refused to instruct the jury that the
plaintiff's failure to examine available books and records barred his
recovery. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "no
duty to use diligence in discovering a fraud is imposed on the in'32 1
jured party."
In the most liberal jurisdictions courts refused to bar the plaintiff from recovery even if he had notice of the need to investigate
and had failed to do so. Three types of notice were involved in
these cases. First, in several cases, a document in the plaintiff's possession constituted the notice to the plaintiff. In Albert v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co.322 the plaintiff purchased four mortgage
participation certificates from the defendant, who had falsely represented to the plaintiff that the mortgages covered only "improved
and income producing properties. ' 32 3 The trial court instructed the
jury to determine whether a legend on the certificates would have
"put a reasonable person on inquiry or knowledge that they were
not improved by buildings or income-producing property." 3 24 The
New York Court of Appeals held that this instruction was reversible
error and stated that "[i]t is no excuse for a culpable misrepresenta'32 5
tion that means of probing it were at hand.
("Because of the legislative background it seems reasonable to assume at the very least
that the most liberal common law views on these questions should govern under the
statutes.").
318 E.g., Troutman v. Stiles, 87 Colo. 597, 290 P. 281 (1930); Clark v. Morrill, 128
Me. 79, 145 A. 744 (1929); Brockton Olympia Realty Co. v. Lee, 266 Mass. 550, 165
N.E. 873 (1929). See also Gallon v. Burns, 92 Conn. 39, 101 A. 504 (1917) (describing
contrasting judicial views on significance of plaintiffs carelessness).
319
See infra notes 320-29 and accompanying text.
320
230 Mich. 504, 202 N.W. 955 (1925).
321
Id. at 509, 202 N.W. at 956. See also King v. Livingston Mfg. Co., 180 Ala. 118,
127-78, 60 So. 143, 145-46 (1912) ("It would ... be singular to hold a swindling deceiver exempt from liability because he has swindled only foolishly credulous and trusting persons ..
").
322
277 N.Y. 421, 14 N.E.2d 625 (1938).
323
Id. at 422-23, 14 N.E.2d at 625.
324
Id. at 423, 14 N.E.2d at 625.
325
Id. See also Martin v. Hughes, 156 Kan. 175, 131 P.2d 682 (1942) (deceit action
alleging defendant orally misrepresented that used car was new; fact that age of car was
inferable from title certificate held not to bar action); Southern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Dinsmore, 225 Ala. 550, 144 So. 21 (1932) (deceit action alleging oral misrepresenta-
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The second type of notice given to plaintiffs in these cases consisted of warnings from others. In Bell v. Smith, 3 26 for example, the
plaintiff was warned by her brother-in-law that a car she was about
to purchase from the defendant was not a 1924 model, as the defendant had claimed. Plaintiff ignored the warning and purchased
the car. The Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld a judgment for
the plaintiff, reasoning that the plaintiff "chose to rely rather on the
representations made by the defendant than on the warning from
32 7
her brother-in-law."
The third type of notice case involved something other than a
warning or document. In Steele v. Banninga,3 28 the defendant, a real
estate agent, falsely informed the plaintiff that a Mrs. Swenson was
the sole owner of certain land. The plaintiff purchased the land with
knowledge that a Mr. Stamp possessed and claimed ownership of
the property. The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the lower
court's judgment for the defendant and ordered a new trial, after
stating that the plaintiffs "[c]onstructive notice of Stamp's rights
329
• . . constitutes no defense to this action."
As the above discussion illustrates, in the more liberal jurisdictions in 1934, the duty of care did not bar recovery in a deceit action. It follows that the duty of care under rule 10b-5 should be
rejected, absent contrary indications from Congress. As has been
shown, however, no such contrary indications exist; rather, Congress has demonstrated its rejection of the duty of care through statutory structure and policy.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's rule lOb-5 jurisprudence indicates that
the elements of the rule 1Ob-5 action are governed by the intent of
Congress, as evidenced by the following factors: the language and
tion in sale of stock; fact that fraud was inferable from stock certificate in plaintiff's possession held not to bar action).
326
6 N.J. Misc. 1079, 143 A. 819 (1928).
327
Id. at 1079, 143 A. at 819-20. See also Williams v. Bedenbaugh, 215 Ala. 200, 110
So. 286 (1926) (plaintiff ignored her attorney's warnings); Starkweather v. Benjamin, 32
Mich. 305 (1875) (plaintiff ignored rumors in community).
328
329

225 Mich. 547, 196 N.W. 404 (1923).

Id. at 553, 196 N.W. at 406. The court added that the "defendant is liable, even
if the truth lay elsewhere and plaintiffs might have found it out had they looked beyond
defendant in their search for it." Id. at 556, 196 N.W. at 407. See Carr v. Harnstrom,
207 Ill. App. 31, 35 (1917) (rejecting instruction that recovery will be denied if "there
were facts and circumstances present sufficient to put the plaintiff upon his guard");
Mason v. Thornton, 74 Ark. 46, 54, 84 S.W. 1048, 1049 (1905) (rejecting instruction
that recovery should be denied where plaintiff had "notice sufficient to excite the attention of a man of ordinary prudence"). See also International Harvester Co. v. Franklin
County Hardware Co., 101 Kan. 488, 167 P. 1057 (1917) (constructive knowledge held
irrelevant in face of defendant's actual fraud).
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history of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, the structure of the 1933
and 1934 Acts, the policies underlying these Acts, and, where necessary, the views on common law deceit of the most liberal jurisdictions at the time the Acts were enacted. A plaintiff's duty of care in
rule 1Ob-5 cases is manifestly inconsistent with the intent of Congress. The duty of care has no basis in the language or history of
either section 10(b) or rule lOb-5. Moreover, it cannot be reconciled with either section 29(a) of the 1934 Act or with the congressional policy regarding enforcement of 1934 Act violations. Finally,
the most liberal common law jurisdictions in 1934 did not impose a
duty of care. Therefore, the duty of care has no proper place in rule
lOb-5 litigation. A plaintiff's carelessness should no longer bar re-

covery for intentional securities fraud.
Abolishing the duty of care will not unduly expand the scope of
rule lOb-5. Plaintiffs will still carry a considerable burden of proof,
including scienter, materiality, and reliance. 330 Thus, a plaintiff who
carelessly ignored what should have been obvious will still be denied recovery unless he can demonstrate that he relied upon inten1
tional and material omissions or misrepresentations.33
The Court's rule lOb-5 jurisprudence applies not only to the
duty of care, but also to all other common law doctrines that the
rule lOb-5 action has imported. Some factors, however, will be
more likely than others to provide affirmative evidence of congressional intent. The language of section 10(b) itself is largely useless
as an indicator of congressional intent. It is difficult to discern
whether this imprecise statutory language expresses congressional
intent only in the prima facie case or in other aspects of the action as
well. Relying on section 10(b)'s language is especially dubious with
respect to private actions, because Congress never considered them.
The history of section 10(b) also is a largely useless indicator of
congressional intent. Congress gave scant attention to section
10(b), leaving a brief and cryptic history of negligible interpretative
value. Similarly, inferences regarding congressional intent are unlikely to emerge from the language and history of rule lOb-5 because the rule is the product of the SEC, not Congress. The most
liberal views of common law deceit in 1934 also provide little help
because they are at best only indirect evidence of congressional intent. The Court has conceded the relative unimportance of comSee supra note 17 for the elements of a rule 10b-5 private action.
Cf. Lucas v. Florida Power & Light Co., 575 F. Supp. 552 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (judgment for defendant for nonfulfillment of duty of care as well as for lack of materiality,
scienter, and causation); Lake v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., [1978 Transfer Binder) FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,509 (N.D. Ind. May 22, 1978) (judgment for defendants for
nonfulfillment of duty of care as well as for lack of reliance and causation). See generally
supra note 17 (discussing elements of rule lOb-5 private action).
330
331
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mon law deceit by deeming it relevant only when the other factors
are inconclusive. The most useful factors are the structure of the
1933 and 1934 Acts and the policies underlying those Acts. They
provide fertile grounds for inferring what Congress would have
done had it actually addressed all aspects of section 10(b).
Each common law doctrine that has found its way into the rule
1Ob-5 private action must be evaluated separately, because each requires discrete application of the relevant factors outlined above.
Lower courts' failure to apply these factors flouts the intent of both
the Supreme Court and Congress.

